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Abstract
Intrinsic Motivation and Information Systems Security Policy Compliance in
Organizations
by Yurita Yakimin Abdul Talib

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of
Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015
Chair: Professor Gurpreet Dhillon
Department of Information Systems, School of Business

Incidents of computer abuse, proprietary information leaks and other security lapses have
been on the increase. Most often, such security lapses are attributed to internal employees in
organizations subverting established organizational IS security policy. As employee compliance
with IS security policy is the key to escalating IS security breaches, understanding employee
motivation for following IS security policy is critical. In addition to several types of extrinsic
motives noted in prior studies, including sanctions, rewards, and social pressures, this study adds
that an important contributing intrinsic factor is empowerment. Per Thomas and Velthouse’s
(1990) intrinsic motivation model, empowerment is the positive feelings derived from IS security
task assessments. Through survey data collected from 289 participants, the study assesses how

dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e., competence, meaning, impact, and choice) as
derived from IS security task may impact the IS security performance of the participants,
measured by their compliance with IS security policy. The study demonstrates that the
competence and meaning dimensions of psychological empowerment have a positive impact on
participants’ IS security policy compliance intention, while impact has a marginal negative
influence on compliance. Furthermore, dimensions of psychological empowerment can be
predicted by structural empowerment facets, particularly IS security education, training, and
awareness (SETA), access to IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security
decision-making. In addition, the competence and meaning dimensions of psychological
empowerment may act as mediators for the relations between structural empowerment and
participants’ IS security policy compliance. Theoretical contributions, managerial implications,
and directions for future research of this study will be discussed.
Keywords: IS security policy compliance, intrinsic motivation, psychological empowerment,
structural empowerment
.

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
This study concerns employee information systems (IS) security policy compliance in
organizations. IS security policy compliance is the act or process of conformity to official
requirements, including disposition to yield to others (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al.,
2010). The consequences of not complying with IS security policy may include insider security
breaches, which pose a significant threat. Over the years, a large body of researchers has
attempted to understand the motivations that influence IS security policy compliance. A general
conclusion of prior research is that extrinsic motivational factors are the main reasons for an
individual to engage in acts that lead to compliance with IS security policy (e.g., Straub, 1990;
Pahnila et al., 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
There have been some studies that point to the importance of intrinsic motivational
factors with respect to IS security policy compliance (e.g., Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011).
Such studies are, however, limited and lack theoretical support. Responding to the limited body
of work in this area, this research attempts to fill the gap in the body of literature besides heeding
to the various calls for undertaking research in the area of intrinsic motivation for IS security
policy compliance (see Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011; Padayachee, 2012). The intrinsic
motivation model from Thomas and Velthouse (1990) is used to investigate the influence of four
dimensions of psychological empowerment (perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and
choice) on IS security policy compliance. In addition, intrinsic motivation theorists have argued
3

that feelings of empowerment not only arise from the innate part of individuals and derived from
a task, but also driven by factors external to the individuals (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Conger and
Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Prior studies in IS security compliance have
suggested various external factors and strategies, such as training, task design, and etc, to
enhance an employee intrinsic motivation (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son,
2011). However, rather than exploring the range of strategies empirically, the studies simply
acknowledged their importance. This current study extends prior research to explore the factors
that enhance individual intrinsic motivation.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides the definitions of important
concepts. Section 1.3 addresses the research problem, specific research questions, and
contributions of the study, as well as the overall organization of the dissertation.

1.2 Definitions
In recent years, the term IS security policy compliance has received a great amount of
attention from researchers and practitioners alike (Straub, 1990; Siponen et al., 2007; Herath and
Rao, 2009a; Myyry et al., 2009). This section explores the concept of IS security policy
compliance in organizations. Two classes of definitions form the basis for developing an
understanding of IS security policy compliance, specifically information systems security and
information systems security policy.
Information Systems Security
IS security refers to a range of activities to control and manage potential threats to data
or information. Such controls help ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Loch
et al., 1992). Dhillon (2007) considered IS security at three levels of control: technical, formal,
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and informal. He argues that any discordance between the three levels may result in potential
security issues.
Technical controls aim at securing the hardware, software, and information held in the
computer systems. Dhillon (2007) identified six categories of threats to the hardware, software,
and the data which reside in computer systems that may lead to a compromise – modification,
destruction, disclosure, interception, interruption, and fabrication. Thus, in protecting technical
systems, controls are normally assigned in the area of access control and authentication (Dhillon,
2007). This might include the application of smart card technology, or the development of block
ciphers, voice analysis, and digital signature. These technology-oriented security controls have
generally helped the organizations to safeguard sensitive information.
However, IS security problems cannot be dealt by mere technical controls. For instance,
perpetrators may find it easier to procure information from documents left in the garbage rather
than electronically via computer systems (Dhillon, 2007). Technological controls require support
from formal controls. Formal controls refer to a proper security responsibility and authority
structures, establishment of all-encompassing strategy and policy, and adequate business
processes. Furthermore, identifying roles and the right people in an organization is needed to
ensure that responsibility, strategy and policy, and business processes are sustained (Dhillon,
2007).
Even formal controls (i.e., the rules and procedures) cannot work on their own (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010). In order to ensure that formal controls work, it is essential that people adopt and
accept them (Dhillon, 2007; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The process of adopting formal controls
involves communication amongst individuals in an organization. Such communication may be
formal or informal. Good communication ensures that controls get socialized into an
5

organization. Balancing the values and attitudes of employees and ensuring the general integrity
of the edifice is at the heart of the socialization process.
IS Security Policy
IS security policy is a part of the formal control structure. A policy sketches the security
roles and responsibilities, and standard operating procedures for protecting the information
resources of a firm (Dhillon, 1997; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Hence, IS security policy is defined as
a baseline statement of the IS security tasks or IS security-related activities that employees
should do to ensure the information of their organizations is protected. The IS security tasks
include the appropriate use of computer and network resources, good password habits, frequently
backing up files, checking for encryptions, manual virus-check, not sharing the computer with
others, locking the computer, and etc. (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Dhillon, 2007; Herath
and Rao, 2009a). Typically, IS security policies are informed by current practices of a firm;
however, various international standards are increasingly used as a basis for defining practices.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800 series documents have been
extensively used to define security policies. Various other standards such as ISO 17799 (now
ISO 27002) and GASSP (Generally Accepted Security System Principles) also exist.
The essence of most standards has been succinctly captured by Kwok and Longley
(1999) in their classic Handbook of Information Security where they note that any IS security
policies should include the following:
•

Definition of information security;

•

Statement of management's intention supporting the goals and principles of information
security;
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•

Explanation of the specific security policies, principles, standards, and compliance
requirements; and

•

Definition of general and specific responsibilities for all aspects of information security
explanation of the process for reporting suspected security incidents

IS Security Policy Compliance
IS security policy compliance refers to the act of an individual carrying out IS security
tasks to maintain IS security, as stipulated by IS security policies (Chan et al., 2005; Herath and
Rao, 2009b). IS security tasks that employees required to perform demand additional time and
effort (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). A study by Albrechtsen (2007) discovered that employees may
choose not to perform many IS security tasks for reasons of convenience. The employees
prioritize other work tasks more than their IS security tasks (Herath and Rao, 2009a). It follows
that to comply with IS security policy means investing more effort and time to execute or
implement the IS security tasks.

1.3. Research problem, questions and contributions
Past research has argued that employee compliance with organizational IS security policy
is motivated by two types of factors, extrinsic and intrinsic (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011;
Padayachee, 2012). Extrinsic factors include sanctions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010), rewards (Boss et
al., 2009), social pressure (Herath and Rao, 2009a), and social climate (Chan et al., 2005).
Although extrinsic motivation explains employee IS security policy compliance, it is not without
limitations. For instance, the observed result of the extrinsic motivation is not always consistent
with theory, largely because individuals are able to neutralize or justify their potentially actions
(Siponen and Vance, 2010). Neutralization refers to psychological techniques, such as defense of
necessity, denial of injury, and denial of responsibility, which people use to enable themselves to
7

commit rule breaking or wrongdoing actions (Sykes and Matza, 1957). One problematic issue is
that neutralization is unobservable (Albrecth et al., 2004). Since neutralization is unobservable, it
becomes difficult to remedy it. Furthermore, individuals who feel controlled or oppressed by the
external forces (e.g., sanctions, rewards, social pressure) might not fully endorse the behavior
and are predicted to show poor persistence in performing a related task (Deci et al., 1999). Thus,
organizations might only gain a temporary IS security advantage, if any, through extrinsic
mechanisms.
Intrinsic factors may also explain employee IS security policy compliance behavior. For
instance, perceived effectiveness of the IS security tasks (Herath and Rao, 2009a), perceived
self-efficacy to execute IS security tasks (Rhee et al., 2009), and perceived ownership of IS
(Anderson and Agarwal, 2010) influence individuals to take IS security actions. It is an
individual’s innate desire to act and/or intrinsic values derived from the IS security tasks that
motivates him/her to carry out IS security actions. In fact, the intrinsic factors are stronger
predictors of IS security behavior that the extrinsic factors (Son, 2011). Intrinsic motivation
models (e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990)
provide the logical backdrop for the argument that intrinsic motivation could influence
individuals to expend time and energy to perform a specific task. However, there is a paucity of
research examining the relations between intrinsic factors and employees IS security behavior.
There are two primary motivations which influence IS security behavior—extrinsic and intrinsic:
the latter is deserving of greater empirical attention (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Son, 2011;
Padayachee, 2012).
To examine the relations between intrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance
behavior, this study draws upon Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model.
8

Thomas and Velthouse (1990) noted that “intrinsic motivation involves positively valued
experiences that the individual derives directly from the task” (p. 688). The principle of the
model is on task assessments regarding four dimensions of psychological empowerment:
perceived competence, meaning, impact, and choice. That is, an individual feels empowered if
he/she perceives that he/she has the capability to perform task activities skillfully and
successfully, if the value of the task is consistent with his/her personal beliefs, if he/she can make
a significant difference or contribute to the organization if he/she executes the task, and finally, if
he/she feels autonomy in the tasks.
Prior studies have argued that feelings of empowerment exerts influence on individuals to
put more effort to execute and perform the task well (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et
al., 2000). While empirical studies have found that these four dimensions are capturing an
essence of the psychological empowerment construct (Spreitzer, 1995a; Kraimer et al., 1999),
researchers have argued that it is also crucial to tease apart which psychological empowerment
dimensions actually drive the associations with outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al.,
1999; Maynard et al., 2012). In fact, studies have found that each dimension contributes to
different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). This study extends prior
research by examining which dimensions of psychological empowerment can best explain
employees’ compliance with IS security policy. This study also not only responds to the gaps in
the IS security literature, but also the empowerment literature by investigating the influences of
each dimension of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance.
In addition, this study seeks to investigate factors that drive individuals’ intrinsic
motivation. Intrinsic motivation theorists have argued that feelings of empowerment are not only
9

emerge from individuals’ assessment of their tasks, but also from factors external to the
individuals (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Conger and Kanungo, 1988; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).
Ryan and Deci (2000) called for additional research to investigate factors that enhance
individuals intrinsic motivation. This has not been investigated within the IS security behavior
literature. Therefore, this study seeks to answer this call by examining several organizational
factors, which are expected to influence individuals’ feelings of empowerment. Specifically, this
study investigates the impact of structural empowerment on psychological empowerment.
Structural empowerment refers to conditions or practices where an organization provides
all levels of employees with more access to power tools—defined as opportunity, resources,
information, and support (Kanter, 1977). Prior studies have provided strong evidence that
structural empowerment drives individual psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1996; Siu et
al., 2005; Wallach and Mueller, 2006; Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Seibert et al., 2011). In the
literature, empowerment work practices have been discussed extensively and various elements of
structural empowerment have been suggested, such as training, participation in decision-making,
and access to information (Spreitzer, 1996; Zacharatos et al., 2005; Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard
et al., 2012). Often, these practices are ‘bundled’ together into one construct, making it difficult
to identify which element of structural empowerment is actually associated with psychological
empowerment (Maynard et al., 2012). Therefore, Maynard et al. (2012) called for future research
to conduct in-depth considerations of the associations between various elements of structural
empowerment on the dimensions of psychological empowerment. Thus, this study examines how
empowerment work practices in terms of security education, training, and awareness (SETA)
programs, access to organizational IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security
decision-making, predict the four dimensions of psychological empowerment.
10

Structural empowerment is associated with psychological empowerment. In turn, both are
related to performance-related outcomes at various levels (i.e., individual, team, or unit). This
notion has been supported in numerous studies (Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). This
means that psychological empowerment serves as a mediator between structural empowerment
and behavioral outcomes. Nielsen (1986) claimed that changing the organizational structural
context is not enough to change individual behavior; ultimately, an individual feeling of
empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (cf. Spreitzer, 1995b). Consistent with
Figureto0.1:
Conceptualthe
Model
this line of argument, this study seeks
investigate
mediating role of dimensions of

psychological empowerment on the relations between elements of structural empowerment and
IS security policy compliance intentions. Figure 1.1 displays the conceptual structure of this
study.

Structural
Empowerment

Psychological
Empowerment

IS Security Policy
Compliance
Intention

Given the background and overview of the research problem, this study aims to extend
the knowledge about employee IS security policy compliance by investigating the influence of
psychological empowerment. In summary, this study addresses the following research questions:
1) What is the impact of employees’ psychological empowerment, particularly
perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice, on IS security policy
compliance intentions?
2) How do elements of structural empowerment, including IS security education,
training, and awareness (SETA), access to information regarding IS security strategy
11

and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making, enhance the dimensions
of psychological empowerment with respect to IS security?
3) How do dimensions of psychological empowerment mediate the relations among
elements of structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance intentions?
To address these questions, this study aims to develop a conceptual research framework
that evaluates employees IS security policy compliance intentions based on Thomas and
Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment
theory. A cross-sectional survey of individuals working in a broad spectrum of firms in the
United States (US) is used to provide empirical support.
The study will contribute to both researchers and practitioners for several reasons. First,
from a theoretical standpoint, an adoption of Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic
motivation theory in IS security context is new. The study will enrich the current body of
knowledge on factors that improve IS security behavior at the workplace. From a practical
perspective, the results may be able to help in defining the best practices for managing employee
behavior with respect to IS security. Finally, the findings are hoping to offer valuable guidelines
for designing and implementation of IS security program in an organization.
The following paragraph outlines the structure of the dissertation and gives a brief
summary of each of the remaining chapters. This dissertation is organized into seven chapters.
Following an introduction, the second chapter reviews the literature in the area of employee IS
security policy compliance. Self-determination theory is used as a conceptual map. In particular,
research related to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and their impact on employee security
behavior is reviewed, and the gaps are identified. Further, the theoretical foundation of the study
is also discussed. The third chapter presents the research hypotheses. The potential antecedents
12

influencing an employee compliance with IS security policy are identified and relevant
hypotheses are developed. The fourth chapter sketches the research methodology used to conduct
this research (e.g, data collection approaches and procedures). The fifth chapter presents the
analysis and the results of the study. The sixth chapter analyzes and synthesizes the findings in
the previous chapter. The final chapter provides the conclusion of the study that includes a
review of the findings, a discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the study,
along with a discussion of the limitations and possible future research directions.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The expectations of an IS security policy do not necessarily translate into desirable
security actions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). For instance, a survey by Ponemon (2009) found that
while more than 71% of respondents were aware of their organizational password sharing
security policy, 47% admitted sharing passwords with coworkers. This type of disconnect
between IS security responsibilities and real-world practices poses a significant challenge for
managing IS security breaches. The consequences of such breaches can be significant. In fact,
recent Computer Security Institute (CSI) industry surveys have shown how insider IS security
breaches are a prevalent problem and are more costly to handle than outsider IS security
breaches (Richardson, 2011). It is therefore important to investigate the factors that motivate
employees to execute the IS security tasks as prescribed in the IS security policies (Straub, 1990;
Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
This section of the dissertation begins with a review of the current body of literature
regarding IS security policy compliance behaviors. Two orientations of motivation have emerged
within the IS security policy compliance literature to explain types of motivation for compliance.
Motivation may be intrinsic or extrinsic. As a result of the review of both orientations, it has
been discovered that the intrinsic motivation perspective remains under-researched (Herath and
Rao, 2009b; Padayachee, 2012). Thus, drawing upon the intrinsic motivation model of Thomas
and Velthouse (1990), a logical argument explaining how and why intrinsic factors can serve as
14

mechanisms to encourage IS security policies compliance is discussed. Next, based on Kanter’s
(1977) structural empowerment model, potential drivers to enhance intrinsic motivation are
discussed.

2.2 Motivations for IS security policy compliance
A person who feels impetus or inspirational to act is considered motivated (Deci and
Ryan, 2000). Ryan and Deci (2000), in their self-determination theory (SDT), organized the
distinction of factors to motivate people to take action into two paradigms, extrinsic and intrinsic
motivation. The term ‘extrinsic motivation’ (Ryan and Deci, 2000) refers to “doing something
because it leads to a separable outcome” (p. 55). It relates to an individual’s belief that he/she
will attain some separable outcome or instrumental value when carrying out specific activity. For
example, employees who perform a IS security task due to fear of sanctions for not doing it are
extrinsically motivated, they perform the task in order to attain the separable outcome of
avoiding sanctions (Straub, 1990).
Intrinsic motivation has been surmised by Broedling (1977) as a “catchall explanation
whenever behaviors occur which cannot be clearly linked to external outcomes” (p. 268). Deci
and Ryan (2009) further stated that the definition of intrinsic motivation is based on two axioms.
First, intrinsic motivation exists within individuals, suggesting that an individual’s motivation to
act comes from intrinsic regulation or from the self, not from others (Deci and Ryan, 2000).
Second, intrinsic motivation exists within the relations between individuals and tasks, suggesting
that engagement in an activity may be rewarding in itself. Intrinsic motivation is based on an
assessment of how the task engagement provides satisfaction or fulfillment of innate
psychological needs or desires (Ryan and Deci, 2000). In other words, the reward is in the
activity itself (Deci and Ryan, 2009). For instance, employees who use computer software in the
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workplace due to the inherit enjoyment of using it are intrinsically motivated (Davis et al., 1992).
In the following section, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation for IS security policy compliance are
reviewed.
Extrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance
One extrinsic motivator for IS security policies compliance which has received a great
deal of attention in the scientific literature is sanctions. A sanction is described as a negative
stimulus or a negative incentive to discourage individuals from performing acts or taking
decisions that are not aligned with organizational goals. Straub (1990) explained that the concept
of sanction is derived from from general deterrence theory (GDT) and is used by traditional
disciplinary systems to intimidate employees. In the IS security literature, a sanction is classified
into the two subcategories of certainty and severity. Certainty of a sanction refers to the
possibility that an employee’s wrongdoing act will be caught, whereas severity of sanction
denotes the degree of punishment if caught (Nagin, 1975). The concept of sanctions assumes
humans to be fundamentally rational; hence, the theory argues that people are less likely to
perform deviant acts if they believe the risk of being punished is high and the punishment severe
(Nagin, 1975).
GDT has had significant influence amongst the IS security scholars (Straub, 1990;
Siponen et al., 2007; Myyry et al., 2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012). Straub (1990)
conducted an empirical field study among 1,211 employees from multiple organizations to
identify strategies for reducing computer abuse. The results suggested that when the certainty
and severity of sanctions for violations are clearly stated and communicated, employees are
highly motivated to use computers appropriately. Similarly, in the context of IS security
compliance, Siponen et al. (2007) integrated GDT, protection motivation theory (PMT), and the
16

theory of reasoned action (TRA) to investigate the impact of sanctions on adherence to IS
security policies. The study consisted of 917 employees in four Finnish organizations. They
found that sanctions had a significant impact on actual compliance with IS security policies.
In addition, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) adopted the rational choice theory (RCT) to examine
how individuals make decisions when facing choices in terms of compliance or noncompliance.
The theory purports that employees make decisions based on an overall assessment of the
consequences of the decision (e.g., compliance with IS security policies). In their study, one
assessment of consequences used was the cost of noncompliance. The authors postulated that an
employee’s belief about the cost of noncompliance were shaped by sanctions. They measured
sanctions as tangible or intangible penalties, monetary or nonmonetary penalties, and
unfavorable personal mention in oral or written assessment reports. Bulgurcu et al. (2010)
predicted that sanctions would drive an employee’s belief about the cost of noncompliance,
which then influences decisions to comply. Based on data collected from 464 employees in the
US who had some familiarity with the requirements of their organizational IS security policies,
their general ideas and predictions were supported.
Monitoring
Organizations have responded to an increase in insider security breaches through the
implementation of control-based monitoring to increase compliance with rules and regulations
(Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002), despite concerns for cost, privacy, trust, performance,
productivity, and satisfaction (Stanton and Weiss, 2000; Mirchandani and Motwani, 2003; Sipior
and Ward, 2009; Smith and Tabak, 2009). A 2010 Cyber Security Watch survey found that 64%
of organizations monitor employee Internet connections, whereas 46% and 32% of organizations
monitor the online activities of suspicious and disgruntled employees, respectively (CSO, 2010).
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Knowing that information is easily transmitted electronically, organizations have increased
monitoring of e-mails to prevent the possibility of leaking trade secrets and business strategies
(Dominique, 1999).
Monitoring techniques range from the evaluation of employee security behaviors to the
electronic surveillance of computer, e-mail, and Internet activities (Straub and Nance, 1990;
Ariss, 2002; Siau et al., 2002; Stanton et al., 2005; Boss et al., 2009; Smith and Tabak, 2009).
Evaluation refers to the application of a feedback system on the output by means of audit and
performance evaluations (Kirby and Davis, 1998; Stanton and Weiss, 2000; Urbaczewski and
Jessup, 2002; Boss et al., 2009). Evaluation uses data to determine whether an employee has
appropriately performed the required security practices and procedures as prescribed in the IS
security policies (Kirsch, 2004). Unless constant evaluation of employee security behaviors is
established, the existence of IS security policies remains meaningless (Boss et al., 2009). For
instance, an IS security auditor may use a server log to track employee IS security online
activities or employers can physically examine any employees’ computer system (Boss et al.,
2009).
Dhillon (2001) stated that informal evaluations, such as interpreting employee behavioral
changes, may also be useful in establishing adequate checks and balances. Within the IS security
literature, the evaluation of employee security behavior is based on the belief that when
employees realize that their IS security activities are being monitored and assessed for
compliance, this knowledge creates a sense of social pressure on them to conform to desired
behavior (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Boss et al., 2009). A study conducted by Boss et al. (2009),
used 1698 valid responses from all levels of employees at one organization in the US to examine
the association between evaluation and IS security compliance behaviors. This results suggested
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that evaluation makes employees feel that the IS security policies is mandatory; hence, it
positively impacts their compliance behaviors.
Studies have also focused on electronic surveillance systems to monitor employee usage
of the Internet and e-mail at the workplace (Straub, 1990; Ariss, 2002; Siau et al., 2002; Tabak
and Smith, 2005). Typically, employers monitor Internet usage to control non-essential
browsing, reduce bandwidth abuse, and eliminate downloads of pirated software (Siau et al.,
2002). E-mail usage is typically scrutinized to prevent wrongful transmitting of confidential
organizational data (such as trade secret and business strategies), e-mail spamming, and
downloading of potential viruses (Siau et al., 2002).
D’Arcy et al. (2009), in a study involving 269 employees from eight organizations in the
US, found that when computer monitoring is known to be in place, incidents of IS misuse drop
significantly. Prior to this study, Straub (1990) found a positive association between monitoring
and the frequency of changing one’s password. Employees tended to comply with a password
security policy because they knew that they are being monitored. Other research has supported
the idea that monitoring activities of deviant behaviors increases the perception of sanctions and
punitive consequences. Fears of sanctions should motivate potential deviants to comply with the
rules and policies (Straub and Nance, 1990; Tyler and Blader, 2005; D’Arcy et al., 2009).
Rewards
A reward is an element of positive control, which is implemented with the goal of
encouraging conformity with the desired behaviors (Boss et al., 2009). Rewards have two
general categories: (1) tangible, such as financial remuneration, medals, and awards, and (2)
intangible, such as job advancement, recognition, and praise by peers (Pahnila et al., 2007;
Bulgurcu et al., 2010). In the IS security setting, employees are encouraged to comply with IS
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security policies when they are sufficiently motivated to attain rewards and recognitions.
Rewards also signal to employees that conformance with IS security policies is mandatory (Boss
et al., 2009). Such IS security policies are not accorded much importance by employees in the
absence of any reward for compliance (Boss et al., 2009).
Stanton et al. (2005) discovered that rewards show a positive correlation with passwordrelated security behaviors, such as changing passwords more frequently and choosing stronger
passwords. Similarly, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) postulated that, based on RCT, the perception of
benefits of compliance is shaped by a reward system. They described rewards as tangible or
intangible compensation which an organization provides in return for compliance with the
requirements of IS security policies. Rewards included salary raises, awards, promotions, and
personal appreciation in either oral or written form. Their study, based on a sample size of 474
respondents from varying organizations, showed that rewards were positively correlated with IS
security policies compliance. Thus, rewards may be used as an effective means for increasing
motivation for IS security policies compliance.
Social Pressures
Individuals may also be motivated to perform actions to avoid guilt and anxiety or to gain
pride and ego-enhancements (Ryan and Deci, 2000). This indicates that the motivation for
individuals to perform a specific action may be the desire to maintain a feeling of self-worth and
self-esteem. This is associated to the pressures individuals receive from their social interaction
with the organizational members to perform the behavior in question (Venkatesh and Brown,
2001). Social pressures exerted by subjective norms (perceived expectation) and descriptive
norms (observation) should positively influence IS security compliance intentions (Herath and
Rao, 2009a).
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Normative beliefs are based on the beliefs as to whether or not significant others expect
the individual to perform a specific behavior (Ajzen, 1991). This indicates that a message about
expectations from one member’s social network is able to influence another member’s behavior.
In the IS security setting, examples of normative beliefs are the expectations of superiors, IT
management, and peers in IS departments on IS security policies compliance (Herath and Rao,
2009a). A study has shown that if an employee believes that others expect IS security policy
compliance from him or her, then that individual will comply (Herath and Rao, 2009a). Simply
put, the possibility of gaining approval from others motivates individuals to perform IS security
compliant behaviors.
Descriptive norms concern observations of behaviors demonstrated by others (Leach,
2003), and they are strongly influenced by the behavior of others. New or existing employees
who need to conform with their organizational norms tend to build their IS security behaviors
according to the IS security practices and behaviors demonstrated by senior management and
peers (Leach, 2003). Chan et al. (2005) examined how perceptions of descriptive norms derive
from the observation of organizational management, direct supervisor’s, and peers’ IS security
behaviors. Management behaviors include the routine actions of management as observed by
individual employees. Such behaviors and practices include outlining written IS security policies
and providing training and awareness programs. These actions demonstrate to employees that the
organization stresses the importance of good IS security. Direct supervisory behaviors and
practices are measured by the repeated actions of supervisors as observed by the individual
employee. Since supervisors have the most contact with subordinates, they are the ideal
candidates for communicating and enforcing organizational goals. Thus, employees who observe
their supervisors giving greater emphasis to prescribed IS security procedures tend to be inclined
21

to carry out the same behaviors. Peer socialization refers to observation of peer behaviors (Chan
et al., 2005). This view holds that an individual’s decision to perform a certain behavior is based
on the observation that others are doing it. In other words, employees’ reciprocate the behavior
of others because they believe they need to do what many others do. Chan et al. (2005) provided
evidence that management practices, supervisory practices, and peer behaviors do influence
employees’ compliant behavior. Similarly, Herath and Rao (2009a) found that if employees see
their coworkers routinely following IS security rules, they are motivated to perform the same
behaviors and, thus, follow the IS security rules as well.
Intrinsic motivation and IS security policy compliance
In recognizing the importance of intrinsic incentives, IS security researchers have
incorporated feelings of competence (Chan et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao,
2009b; Rhee et al., 2009), feelings of contribution from one’s IS security actions (Herath and
Rao, 2009a), and feelings of value congruence and legitimacy (Son, 2011) in their models.
Perceived competence
Competence or self-efficacy refers to an individual’s belief in his/her capability to
perform a specific task (Bandura, 1977). Self-efficacy theory argues that individuals with low
self-efficacy on a specific task tend to avoid that task. Self-efficacy regarding IS security tasks
have been widely studied (e.g., Chan et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao, 2009b;
Rhee et al., 2009). Chan et al. (2005) examined the causal role of employee self-efficacy and IS
security compliant behavior in IT intensive organizations in the logistics and petrochemical
industries. This study indicated that employees’ belief in their efficacy in IS security influenced
their decision to perform (or not perform) IS security related tasks, particularly those prescribed
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through organizational IS security policies. Chan et al.’s (2005) results indicated that selfefficacy perceptions are an important determinant of performance related to a specific task.
Self-efficacy beliefs also affect individual efforts and persistence efforts related to a
specific task. Rhee et al. (2009) showed that self-efficacy in IS security influences individuals’
intention to strengthen IS security efforts, both in terms of security technology use and securityconscious behavior. Furthermore, self-efficacy influenced individuals’ intention to continue their
IS security efforts. That is, they tend to agree to strengthen their knowledge about IS security,
enforce IS security procedures, and add extra IS security measures in the future. The results
suggest that if employees have high levels of IS security self-efficacy, they will increase
compliance-related behaviors.
Perceived effectiveness
Herath and Rao (2009a) examined how intrinsic incentives affect employee compliance
behavior. This study considered intrinsic incentive in term of feeling of contribution from one’s
action. Herath and Rao (2009a) postulated that if employees believe that their IS security actions
or behaviors can contribute to the betterment of the organization, it is likely that they will carry
out the actions. Their web-based survey was carried out in collaboration with Cyber Task Force,
Buffalo Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and involved 312 employees from
77 organizations across the US. Herath and Rao’s (2009a) results indicated that employees adopt
a favorable IS security compliance behaviors if they believe that their IS security actions are
effective. Thus, intrinsic motivation, measured by perceived effectiveness of IS security actions
predicted employees intention to comply with IS security policies.
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Beliefs about organization
Son (2011) suggested that employees’ assessment of their employer may be an important
source of intrinsic motivation to follow rules. Drawing upon the work by Tyler and Blader
(1995), Son (2011) specified two specific employer assessment conditions: perceived value
congruence and perceived legitimacy. Perceived value congruence refers to the alignment
between individuals and organizational IS security values (Son, 2011). Son (2011) posited that
individuals (and organizations) tend to cooperate when their belief systems match. Thus, when
employees perceive their values are in congruence with the organization’s values, they tend to
commit and maintain a long-lasting relation. However, if there is a lack of alignment, chances
are that an individual is not loyal to the organization and, thus, poses a security risk. In the
context of IS security policy compliance, if employees feel that their IS security value system is
in congruence with that of the organization, there is a higher chance of IS security policy
compliance. Perceived legitimacy refers to employees’ assessment of the IS security policy in
terms of its appropriateness and desirability (Son, 2011). Son (2011) purported that it is
important for organisation to achieve legitimacy in order to influence the organisational members
behaviors. The results of his study indicated that both perceived value congruence and legitimacy
were positively related to IS security compliance behaviors. Thus, employees innate desires and
preferences for legitimacy and value congruence of the IS security were found to influence thier
IS security behaviors.
Another strand of research has focused on the assessment of an asset as a source of
individual intrinsic motivation to perform a desired behavior. Specifically, this stream of
research is based on individual assessment of psychological ownership of an asset. The logical
argument is that rational people will not destroy or take unnecessary action against something
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that belongs to them. As much as possible, such people will protect what belongs to them. In the
context of IS security behavior related to home computing, Anderson and Agarwal (2010)
investigated the impact of feelings of ownership of the Internet and the computer on behavioral
intentions to protect the Internet and one’s computer. They found that an individual’s level of
psychological ownership towards the Internet and computer does influence IS security behavior.
Table 0.1 presents a summary of seminal work in the two paradigms, dominated by the extrinsic
motivation paradigm.
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Table 0.1: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of IS security policy compliance
Motivation Factors

INTRINSIC

EXTRINSIC

Sanctions

Description

Theory Used

I comply with security policies to avoid
penalties.

Some Seminal
Papers

General
Deterrence
Theory (GDT);
Agency Theory

Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; Pahnila et
al., 2007; Straub,
1990

Control Theory

Boss et al., 2009;
Stanton and
Weiss, 2000;
D’Arcy et al.,
2009; Straub, 1990

Monitoring

I comply with security policies because I
know my activities is being monitored.

Rewards

I comply with security policies to attain
rewards.

Normative
Beliefs

I comply with security policies because I
belief that significant others (superiors, IT
management and peers in IS departments)
expect me to comply.

Protection
Motivation
Theory

Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; Herath and
Rao, 2009; Pahnila
et al., 2007

I comply with security policies because I
Social Climate observe that my management, supervisors
/ Observation and colleagues give great emphasis to
prescribed security procedures.

Protection
Motivation
Theory

(Chan et al., 2005;
Herath and Rao,
2009; Leach, 2003)

I comply with security policies because I
Perceived
perceive that my security actions will help
Effectiveness
for the betterment of my organization.
I comply with security policies because I
Perceived Self- perceive that I have the skills or
Efficacy
competency to perform the security
activities.
Perceived
I comply with security policies because I
Value
perceive that the security values/goals are
Congruence congruence with my values.
I comply with security policies because I
Perceived
perceive that I own the assets (computer
Ownership
and the Internet).

Boss et al., 2009;
Rational Choice
Bulgurcu et al.,
Theory; Theory of
2010; Stanton et
Planned Behavior
al., 2005

Herath and Rao,
2009
Self-efficacy
theory

(Chan et al., 2005;
Rhee et al., 2009;
Workman et al.,
2008)
Son, 2011
Anderson and
Argawal, 2010

Extrinsic or intrinsic motivation?
Herath and Rao (2009a) examined the influence of variables under both extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation models of IS security policy compliance intentions. They reported that
employees’ intrinsic motivation, measured by perceived effectiveness, predicted IS security
compliance intentions (β = .22, p < .05). The extrinsic motivation model, measured by severity
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of penalty, certainty of detection, peer behavior, and normative beliefs, was partially supported.
Overall, Herath and Rao’s (2009a) findings suggested that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators
may influence the IS security behaviors of employees. However, the study did not predict the
magnitude of contribution for each model (i.e., the extrinsic and the intrinsic motivation model).
Recent work by Son (2011) examined the impact of perceived certainty and severity of
sanctions (i.e., the extrinsic motivation model), and perceived legitimacy and perceived value
congruence (i.e., the intrinsic motivation model) of IS security policy compliance among
employees in the US. Both extrinsic and intrinsic models were assessed for their significance.
The results of Son’s (2011) study showed that factors that rooted in the intrinsic motivation
model were significantly related to IS security policy compliance (β = .36 and .26, p < .05).
However, contrary to expectations, both extrinsic factors were not significant (β = .05 and .06, p
> .1). More interestingly, Son (2011) predicted that both the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
models will explain significantly more employees’ IS security policy compliance than would
variables from either the extrinsic or intrinsic motivation model. His results showe that the
extrinsic model explained 16% and the intrinsic model explained 41% of variance of IS security
policies compliance behaviors. By simultaneously testing the relations between the extrinsic
factors, intrinsic factors, and IS security policy compliance intention, the model explained a
substantial amount of variance of IS security policies compliance behavior (R2 = .42). Son’s
(2011) results showed that the contribution of the intrinsic motivation model exceeded that of the
extrinsic motivation. He proposed that intrinsic motivation may generate alternative explanations
and solutions for compliance with organizational IS security policy. Thus, organizations should
increase their emphasis on intrinsic motivation-based approaches, and rely less on extrinsicbased approaches (Son, 2011).
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Summary
In sum, IS security policy compliance research has witnessed the rise of the extrinsic
motivation argument. Scholars considering extrinsic factors to be important in ensuring
compliance have largely examined the four dimensions of sanctions, rewards, monitoring, and
social pressures. It goes without saying that individual compliance with IS security policy can be
explained with respect to the extent of sanctions or rewards, how well they are being monitored,
and what their social pressures might be.
Although most past and current research in IS security policy compliance has focused
mainly on employees’ value of extrinsic rewards (see Table 0.1) employees tend to value both
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (Herath and Rao, 2009a). Intrinsic motivational factors such as
self-efficacy, psychological ownership, perceived effectiveness, and perceived value congruence
influence employees’ decisions to comply with IS security policy. Interestingly, a recent study
provided empirical evidence that the intrinsic factors could explain more of the variance in IS
security policy compliance than extrinsic factors (Son, 2011). This suggests that the factors
constituting intrinsic motivation to comply with IS security policy are certainly promising.
Unfortunately, relatively little research has been conducted within the intrinsic motivation
paradigm. Hence, calls have be made to investigate other intrinsic factors (Herath and Rao,
2009a; Son, 2011; Padayachee, 2012).
Further, Herath and Rao (2009a) and Son (2011) have acknowleged few strategies or
drivers, such as IS security training, and IS security climate, to enhance employees’ intrinsic
motivation. However, eventually no empirical research has investigated the drivers to enhance
employees’ intrinsic motivation. As a result, this study investigates the impact of psychological
empowerment, a factor rooted in intrinsic motivation model, on IS security policies compliance
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intentions, and explores the antecedents of psychological empowerment. The following section
describes the theoretical foundation of this study.

2.3 Theoretical foundation
Based on the gap described above, this section seeks to explain individuals’ intrinsic
motivation to comply with IS security policy. In doing so, the present study incorporates the
conceptual ideas of Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation/empowerment model,
as well as Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory.
Thomas and Velthouse’s Intrinsic Motivation/Empowerment Model
Although there are various definitions of intrinsic motivation, Thomas and Velthouse
(1990) defined it as “positively valued experiences that the individual derives directly from the
task” or “those generic conditions by an individual, pertaining directly to the task, that produce
motivation and satisfaction” (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990, p. 668). This indicates that a
motivation to act occurs within a person and refers to the task itself. Thomas and Velthouse
(1990) claimed that a task refers to a set of activities directed towards a purpose. In other words,
a task contains both activities and goals. Thus, the design of their model may be applied to
various tasks in the work context.
Thomas and Velthouse’s model conceptualizes empowerment as intrinsic task
motivation. Empowerment refers to a set of cognitions reflecting one’s perceptions about their
task and their ability to control, shape or influence the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990;
Spreitzer, 1995b). This contrasts with structural empowerment, which focuses on managerial
practices that share power with employees (Spreitzer, 2007). Psychological empowerment is
formed based on individuals’ assessments or judgments of a task regarding four cognitions:
competence, meaning, impact, and choice (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Thus, the core of their
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model focuses on identifying these cognitions, known as task assessments. In other words,
individuals are considered intrinsically motivated whenever they experience these four
cognitions from a task, which are described next.
Perceptions of competence
Competence or self-efficacy refers to an assessment of one’s own capability to perform a
task activities skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Bandura (1995, p. 2) defined selfefficacy as “the belief in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required
to manage prospective situations.” Thus, competence relates to an individual’s belief regarding
whether he/she has the ability to perform a specific task. Self-efficacy theory states that when a
person has low self-efficacy regardind a particular skill to execute a specific task, he or she will
avoid such a tasks where this skill is required (Bandura, 1977).
Perceptions of meaning
Meaning refers to judgments of the value of a task goals with individual’s own goals and
standards (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). A feeling of meaningfulness materializes if there is a
fit between the task objectives and employees own beliefs, values, and behaviors (Spreitzer,
1995a). This is analogous to Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) concept of experience
meaningfulness of the work. Experiencing work as meaningful indicates the degree to which a
person believes that the work objective or purpose is significant in one’s own value system
(Hackman and Oldham, 1980). Thus, the cognitive assessment of task meaningfulness relates to
an individuals’ belief concerning whether a given task is trivial or not. If a task is important or
meaningful to individuals, they will invest their energy to accomplish the goal of the task
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). In contrast, individuals who perceive that a task is meaningless
tend to be apathetic and detached from said task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).
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Perceptions of impact
Impact refers to judgments concerning how a behavior or an action regarding a task may
make a significant difference to the organization in terms of accomplishing the goal of the task
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Thus, the cognitive assessment of impact relates to an
individual’s belief regarding whether he/she can contribute to the organization by performing or
executing a specific task. If individuals are aware that the results of their action will benefit
others, it encourages them to invest their time and energy to perform the task (Thomas and
Velthouse, 1990). This is analogous to the knowledge of results in Hackman and Oldham’s
(1980) model. According to Hackman and Oldham (1980), knowledge of the results indicates
that individuals know about the outcomes of their work activities. If they know that the impact of
their work will be beneficial and significant, they become intrinsically motivated to perform said
activity well (Hackman and Oldham, 1980).
Perceptions of choice/self-determination
Choice involves a causal responsibility for a person’s actions (Thomas and Velthouse,
1990). Thomas (2009) asserted that a “sense of choice also gives you a feeling of ownership” (p.
54). A cognitive assessment of choice is based on whether people believe that they have
autonomy or experience self-determination in how they perform a given task (Ryan and Deci,
2000; Deci and Ryan, 2009). In other words, cognitions of choice means believing that one has
control or discretion in initiating and regulating a specific task, and has the authority to make
decisions related to the task. When individuals experience a sense of choice over their task, they
feel personal responsibility concerning the outcomes of their task (Oldham and Hackman, 1980),
hence they will put more effort in the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Together, Thomas and
Velthouse (1990) stated that experiencing empowerment is derived directly from a task manifest
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in cognitions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. In other words, individuals feel
empowered if they are confident they have the skills and ability to do their task well, the task is
important to them, they have freedom to make decisions regarding the task, and believe that they
can have an impact on task outcomes.
Measuring psychological empowerment
Psychological empowerment is an overall construct or “gestalt” of four dimensions, viz.
perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice (Spreitzer 1995a). This indicates that
psychological empowerment is a four-dimensional construct. This further suggests that the
overall degree of psychological empowerment is limited if one of the dimensions is low or
absent (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995a). For instance, although people may
believe they can have an impact and that they have discretion to make decisions, if they do not
feel they have skill to perform the task competently or lack of sense of meaning concerning the
task, they will not feel empowered (Spreitzer, 1995a). Spreitzer (1995a) developed a single 12item (3 items per dimension) to measure psychological empowerment. Her measure has been
used predominantly in empirical research in various settings (Spreitzer, 2007). The measurement
of psychological empowerment assumes that empowerment is continuous, using a 7-point Likert
scale.
Spreitzer (1995a) found support for the idea that all four dimensions may be loaded onto
a single second-order psychological empowerment construct. Further, Kraimer et al. (1999)
performed a second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and found support for the notion
that psychological empowerment is made up of the four cognitions. The fit statistics indicated
that the one-factor model (all 12 empowerment items were hypothesized to represent a single
construct) provided a much worse fit than the four-factor model. Thus, the results provided
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support for the convergent and discriminant validity for Spreitzer’s (1995a) multidimensional
construct of psychological empowerment. Empirical evidence across various fields, and across
both cultures and work contexts has supported Spreitzer’s (1995a) findings (e.g., Spreitzer,
1995b, Spreitzer, 1996, Chen and Klimoski, 2003; Carless, 2004; Alge et al., 2006; Zhang and
Bartol, 2010; Ford and Tetrick, 2011).
Although the four-dimensional measure of psychological empowerment was supported in
the literature, a meta-analysis concluded that the factor loadings were not consistent either across
dimensions or samples (Maynard et al., 2012). This suggests that there is scientific merit to
assess the dimensions separately (Maynard et al., 2012). Spreitzer et al. (2007) posited that these
different dimensions may predict different outcomes, and are influenced by different
antecedents. Some researchers have investigated how each of the four dimensions of
psychological empowerment predicted different outcomes and is influenced by different factors
(Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999, Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Logan
and Ganster, 2007). For instance, several studies have investigated the influence of perceived
meaningfulness of a job on positive work outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999;
Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005). Wat and Shaffer (2005) conducted a survey to assess
how supervisors and subordinates perceptions of meaning of their work affects their
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Using a sample from investment banks in Hong
Kong, they found that perceived meaning was related to courtesy behavior, a dimension of OCB.
Wat and Shaffer (2005) explained that when task values are consistent with individuals’ values,
they feel a commitment to and involvement with the goals. In addition, Wat and Shaffer (2005)
found that the self-determination dimension relates to altruism or helping behavaior. In a crosssectional study among mid-level employees in manufacturing industry, Spreitzer et al. (1997)
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assessed how job satisfaction, job strain, and task performance are affected by perceptions of
impact of one’s job. This results indicated that perceptions of impact best predict task
performance, and not significantly related to job satisfaction and job strain. However, they found
that perceptions of competence were related to satisfaction and negative to job strain (Spreitzer et
al., 1997).
While this perspective has not received due attention in the literature, Maynard et al.
(2012) has called for research to determine the influence that the four dimensions have on
various outcomes. This study seeks to answer the call by investigating the association between
dimensions of psychological empowerment and individuals performance, in a context of IS
security.
Individual performance-related outcomes of psychological empowerment
Findings across a wide range of studies showed that psychological empowerment
influences various outcomes, including organizational level performance, team level
performance, individual attitudes, individual behaviors, individual performance, and many others
(Spreitzer et al., 2007; Chen and Klimoski, 2003; Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Ford and Tetrick,
2011). Meta-analytic evidence has supported this (Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard et al., 2012). The
scope of the literature review is limited to individual level performance-related outcomes as this
study focuses on individuals’ IS security policy compliance behaviors. To comply means to exert
energy to perform the IS security tasks in order to achieve the organizational IS security
objectives. Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation theory postulates that the level
of psychological empowerment is likely to affect outcomes, such as active and concentration of
energy upon task. Active and concentration of energy upon task can be described as putting more
“effort” or “working hard” towards accomplishing the goals of the task (Thomas and Velthouse,
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1990). This indicates that the stronger the cognitions of competence, meaning, impact, and
choice deriving from a task, the greater the individuals’ motivation to invest more energy in
behaviors towards achieving that task. Related outcomes include individual task performance,
work effort, task or work

effectiveness, and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB)

(Spreitzer et al., 1997; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Ke and Zhang, 2011; Campbell et al., 2003; Chen
and Klimoski, 2003). The following section reviews the influence of different dimensions of
psychological empowerment on individual performance-related outcomes.
Spreitzer et al. (1997) investigated the impact of each of the dimensions of psychological
empowerment on employee work effectiveness. Effectiveness may be described as the degree to
which individuals fulfill or exceed work role expectations. Their results showed that individuals
who experience a stronger sense of competence and impact in the workplace tend to be more
effective on the job (Spreitzer et al., 1997). Spreitzer et al.’s (1997) findings suggest that
employees may see that their effort has made a difference (based on their prior performance) and
feel that they can have an impact. In addition, the findings indicate that competence is necessary
for employee effectiveness. Thus, employees who feel empowered in terms of impact and
competence on the job are more motivated to invest their energy in the job and perform
effectively.
Perceived competence increases task performance and goals accomplishment by
increasing task effort and persistence (Bandura, 1977). That is, the stronger the perceived
competence, the more persistence and active employees efforts. Task effort may be described as
the amount of energy employees expend when carrying out their job. Rhee et al. (2009) showed
that self-efficacy in IS security influences individual intention to strengthen their IS security
efforts, both in terms of security technology use and IS security-conscious behaviors.
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Furthermore, their results showed that perceived self-efficacy influenced individuals’ intention to
continue their IS security efforts. That is, higher efficacious employees tend to strengthen their
IS security behaviors, enforce IS security procedures, and add additional security measures in the
future. In another research, Kraimer et al. (1999) found that perceived meaningful of a job was
related to employees’ intention to stay longer in the job. Individuals who found their job
meaningful are likely to be motivated to continue putting more effort into their current job. Thus,
employees who find meaning in their work tend to engage in a high level of sustained work
effort.
In addition, the meaning dimension of empowerment has been found to result in task
performance (Ke and Zhang, 2011), as individuals reported more value and worth in the task
they were required to complete. Employee task performance describes individual behaviors that
are aimed at achieving firm goals (Campbell et al., 1993). In other words, task performance
reflects behaviors that employees engage in to accomplish desired organizational objectives. Wat
and Shaffer (2005) conducted a study to assess how supervisors and subordinates perceptions of
meaning of their work affects their organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB). They found that
perceived meaning was related to courtesy behavior, a dimension of OCB. Wat and Shaffer
(2005) explained that because the work values are consistent with individuals’ values, they feel a
commitment to and involvement with the work goals. Therefore, individuals with higher levels
of meaningfulness related to the work may engage in behaviors that helps their organization to
achieve specified goals.
In sum, the reviewed studies provide support for the notion that the perceptions of
competence, meaning, impact, and choice drive individuals to expend effort to perform a related
task, as well as to achieve goal of the task.
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Antecedences of psychological empowerment
Theories have documented the need of drivers to enhance one’s intrinsic motivation
related to his/her task or job (Hackman and Oldham, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and
Velthouse, 1990). For example, Hackman and Oldham (1980) posited that enhancing intrinsic
motivation concerns the properties of the job itself. Hackman and Oldham’s job characteristics
model suggests five job characteristics, namely skill variety, task identity, task significance,
autonomy, and feedback from a job, as antecedents to influence one’s intrinsic motivation.
Similarly, Thomas and Velthouse (1990) contended that an individual’s work environment is an
important factor that can influence the level of intrinsic motivation.
In a study of the intrinsic motivation behind IS security policy compliance, Bulgurcu et
al. (2010) suggested that an organization may use external instrumentals, such as training, to
influence employees’ perceptions of intrinsic benefits. Similarly, Son (2011) stated that an
organization can implement training and education programs, and tighten the connection
between the objective of the IS security policy and employees internal value to drive employees’
intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, Herath and Rao (2009a) have suggested to enhance
appropriate IS security climate in order to improve employees perceived effectiveness of their IS
security tasks. Rather than exploring the range of external factors, these studies simply
acknowledged their importance. Hence, it is imperative to explore the antecedents to influence
employees’ intrinsic motivation, specifically their psychological empowerment.
Thus far, a broad range of antecedents of psychological empowerment has been reported
in the organizational literature. These include job characteristics, structural empowerment, and
leadership style (Spreitzer, 1995b; 1996; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000; Hon and
Rensvold, 2006; Logan and Ganster, 2007). For instance, Kraimer et al. (1999) linked Hackman
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and Oldham’s (1980) five job characteristics to the four dimensions of empowerment. Kraimer et
al. (1999) found that job meaningfulness was related to perceptions of meaning, task feedback
was related to perceptions of impact and competence, and job autonomy was related to the
experience of self-determination. The role of leadership may also influence one’s feelings of
empowerment. For instance, transformational leadership, leader-member exchange (LMX), and
trust in one’s leader were associated with feelings of empowerment among subordinates (Kark et
al., 2003; Avolio et al., 2004; Ergeneli et al., 2007). Specifically, this current study focuses on
structural empowerment, based on Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory. The
argument is that, when management transfers power to subordinates, feeling of empowerment
should follow.
Kanter’s Structural Empowerment Theory
Although several researchers have explored the conception of structural empowerment,
Kanter (1977) identified it first. Structural empowerment refers to conditions or practices where
an organization provides subordinates with an amount of power. According to Kanter, power is
derived from the structural conditions in an organization, not inherent from personality traits or
effects of socialization. Thus, the focus of Kanter’s theory is on the employees’ perception of the
work conditions, rather than the individuals, which determine what happened.
Kanter (1977) discussed several practices that indicate structural empowerment: (1)
access to opportunity, (2) access to information, and (3) participation in decision-making. First,
access to opportunity relates to job or task conditions that provide individuals with chances for
growth and development within the organization, as well as chances to develop their skills,
abilities, and knowledge. Access to opportunity allows an individual to learn about skills and the
economies of the larger organization (Lawler, 1986). Lancshinger (1996) defined access to
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opportunity as opportunities for growth and movement within an organization as well as
opportunities to enhance and develop one’s knowledge and skills. This could be achieved
through training and education programs. Educational efforts contribute to individuals’ intrinsic
motivation by increasing the belief in their capability to perform task activities skillfully
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 2007). According to Gist and Mitchell (1992),
attempts to improve sense of competence or self-efficacy should involve some formal training. In
addition, a training program that provides information on the effectiveness of performance (task
feedback) should enhance individuals’ belief about the impact of their work activities (Hackman
and Oldham, 1980).
Liao et al. (2009) argued that if management invests in training programs, it may enhance
employees’ human capital, employees’ knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) to provide quality
service to customers. In return, the KSAs acquired through the training may positively influence
employees’ confidence in their competence in service delivery. The study showed that high
performance work systems (HPWS), which include training programs was positively related to
cognitions of empowerment. Bonias et al. (2010) found support for Liao et al’s (2009) results in
the context of quality care to patients in hospitals. Bonias et al.’s (2010) study showed that
training, part of a HPWS, was positively associated to the dimensions of psychological
empowerment – perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Logan and Ganster
(2007) conducted a field experiment that tested the effects of an empowerment intervention (i.e.
training) among unit managers of a large trucking company in the USA. However, their results
were contrary to the hypothesis, as training had a negative significant effect on the participants’
sense of competence. This indicates that although training leads to increases in KSAs, it can also
reduce the participants’ perceived level of competence.
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Second, Kanter (1977) posited that access to information refers to ability to obtain
knowledge and information necessary to carry out an individual’s task as well as information
concerning what is going on in the larger organization. In her second edition of the book, she
posited that “to be empowering, top management must make more information available to more
people at more levels through more devices” (Kanter, 1986 p.5). Lancshinger (1996) referred to
access to information as having information regarding organizational goals and policy changes.
More specifically, previous researchers have focused on information regarding the mission and
future direction of the organization (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1995b, 1996; Bordin et al., 2006).
Access to information related to goals and strategic directions allows an individual to see the
“big picture”, which creates an understanding on how his or her work contributes to the firm’s
goals (Bowen and Lawler, 1992). Thus, such an individual will be able to make better decisions
related to his/ her task.
Quinn and Spreitzer (1997) conducted interviews with 12 senior executives in a
manufacturing company. The results of the interviews showed that empowerment is about
delegation and accountability. It is a process in which top management develops a clear
organizational mission, along with a vision and values, and communicates said vision to the
members of the organization (Quinn and Spreitzer, 1997). They found that providing a clear
vision allows people in the organization to feel highly empowered, as they understand top
management’s vision and strategic direction of the organization. With an understanding of the
vision and the direction of the organization, they experience enhanced levels of confidence and
the ability to act without waiting for approval from a supervisor. Earlier, Lawler (1992) posited
that accessing organization’s mission contributes to individuals’ intrinsic motivation by
increasing the belief in their ability to make and influence decisions that are congruent with the
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organizational goals and mission. In addition, studies found that access to information may help
employees to perceive a given job or task as meaningful and important, because they see and
understand how their task can contribute to the goals (Spreitzer, 1995a; Liao et al., 2009).
Third, Kanter’s (1977) theory also suggests an empowerment through participation. This
indicates that employees are able to provide inputs and influence over decisions. Inputs in this
context consist of strategic and day-to-day operational decisions related to their job or task.
Knoop (1995) stated that participation is the act of sharing decision-making with others to
achieve organizational goals. As employees are at the operational level, they know better how
specific actions related to their job or task affect the organization. Employees are also more
likely to offer valuable ideas on how operations may be improved. Subsequently, their
meaningful suggestions are more likely to be accepted and adopted. Participative climate helps
employees to belief that they are an important asset of the organization and that they can make
significant impact to the organization (Spreitzer, 1996). Lawler (1992) reasoned that when
employees are more involved in the decision-making process concerning organizational tasks,
they are more aware of the tasks requirements (i.e. sense of meaningful), and, hence are more
likely to take effective actions.
Spreitzer’s (1996) study reported that participative organizational climate significantly
correlated to individuals’ feelings of empowerment. In the context of service industry, Liao et al.
(2009) argued that increased decision-making power may enhance employees’ confidence in
their competence to handle customers. Their findings showed that employee experience with the
high performance work system (HPWS), including participation in decision-making, influences
one’s feelings of empowerment. Bordin et al. (2006) also found support for this argument in the
context of white collar IT employees.
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In addition, Wallach and Mueller (2006) examined opportunities for employees to
participate in decision-making within human service organizations. Their study confirmed earlier
findings (e.g., Bordin et al., 2006; Liao et al., 2009) that structures in organization that allow
employees to participate in decision-making enhances their psychological empowerment,
manifested by four cognitions, competence, meaning, impact and autonomy. However, the study
also reported that when controlling for variables such as role ambiguity, peer support, and
supervisory working alliances, the relations between participation in decision-making and
perceived empowerment did not remain statistically significant.
As shown, many studies have examined the relations between structural empowerment
and the psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1996; Laschinger et al., 2004; Siu et al., 2005;
Wallach and Mueller, 2006). However, most of the studies have conceptualized structural
empowerment as a ‘bundle’ of practices (e.g., Laschinger et al., 2004; Siu et al., 2005) that make
it difficult to identify which structural empowerment elements are actually associated with
psychological empowerment. Additionally, as Spreitzer’s (1996) and Wallach and Mueller’s
(2006) work has exemplified, psychological empowerment has been conceptualized as a
composite of perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Again, this makes it
difficult to tease apart which dimensions were actually driven by the elements of structural
empowerment. Spreitzer (2007) noted that the different dimensions of psychological
empowerment may be influenced by different antecedents. Similarly, Maynard et al. (2012)
called for future research to take in-depth considerations of the various elements of structural
empowerment and their association with the dimensions of psychological empowerment. In
response to these notions and calls, this study attempts to investigate the relations among the
elements of structural empowerment (i.e., training, access to information regarding strategy and
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goals, and participation in decision-making) and the dimensions of psychological empowerment
(i.e., perceptions of competence, meaning, impact and choice) in the context of IS security.
The mediating role of psychological empowerment
The concept of psychological empowerment serving as mediator between structural
empowerment and individual performance-related outcomes has been repeatedly supported in
numerous studies (e.g., Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). Changing an organizational
structural context is not enough to change individual behaviors; ultimately, an individual’s sense
of empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (Nielsen, 1986 cf. Spreitzer, 1995a).
For example, Spreitzer (1995b) found that psychological empowerment partially mediated the
relation between social structural and innovative behavior. In addition, Liao et al. (2009) found
that cognitions of empowerment fully mediate the relations between a HPWS and service
performance. Further, Laschinger et al. (2001) found that psychological empowerment mediates
the relations between structural empowerment and individual satisfaction. In these studies, both
the structural and psychological empowerments were measured as composite constructs.
When considering the dimensions of psychological empowerment independently, Gist
and Mitchell (1992) reported that self-efficacy did mediate the effects of training on individual
performance. Further, Liden et al. (2000) found that perceived meaning partially mediated the
relations between job characteristics and job satisfaction. In a different context, Bonias et al.
(2010) tested for a mediating effect of all dimensions of psychological empowerment and found
that senses of competence, meaning, and autonomy fully mediated the relations between a
HPWS and quality care to patients. This dissertation partly replicates these previous studies, by
investigating the mediating role of each individual dimension of psychological empowerment in
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the relations between elements of structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance
behavior (i.e., individual performance-related outcomes).

2.4 Conclusion
Reviewing what has been discussed thus far in the literature review section, a number of
conclusions may be drawn. First, this study classified and identified current research direction in
IS security policy compliance research. The views were systematically classified according to
Ryan and Deci’s (2000) extrinsic-intrinsic motivation framework. The literature review
established the dominance of the extrinsic motivation paradigm. There have only been a few
attempts diverting from this mainstream view. The limitations of these approaches have led to
the emergence of the intrinsic motivation perspective. Drawing upon Thomas and Velthouse’s
(1990) intrinsic motivation/empowerment model, psychological empowerment is conceptualized
as intrinsic motivation, which is formed based on individuals’ assessments or judgments of a task
regarding four cognitions: competence, meaning, impact, and choice. Empirical studies
concluded that the dimensions of psychological empowerment lead to various individual
performance-related outcomes, specifically task effort, task performance, and work
effectiveness. However, prior studies in the context of IS security have given little focus to the
four dimensions of psychological empowerment, except for perceptions of competence. Thus,
the current study includes all four dimensions as predictors of IS security compliance intentions.
Second, Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory posits that intrinsic motivation should be
enhanced or driven by environmental factors. While the IS security compliance literature
acknowledged the importance of external factors to influence intrinsic motivation, no study has
empirically explore the associations (see Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son,
2011). Based on Kanter’s structural empowerment theory, studies have found that individuals in
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positions with access to power, as measured by opportunities to obtain training, access to
information, and participation in decision-making, experience an increase in their psychological
empowerment. Although theory and empirical studies have provided support for the assertion
that these structural empowerment facets are antecedents of one’s psychological empowerment,
few studies have investigated the impact of each structural empowerment facet on the
dimensions of psychological empowerment. This study seeks to fill that gap in the context of IS
security.
Finally, the vast majority of research has considered psychological empowerment as a
mediator. This study follows that notion, investigates the mediating role of the dimensions of
psychological empowerment on the relations between structural empowerment facets and IS
security policy compliance intentions. Accordingly, the next chapter of this study proposes a
research framework that incorporates the constructs derived from the two theories, Thomas and
Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment
theory, along with the hypothesized relations.
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Chapter 3. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses
Development
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has reviewed the effects of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on IS
security policy compliance. Although extrinsic motivation dominates the literature, IS security
scholars have begun to consider intrinsic motivation as another predictor of IS security policy
compliance. Despite the contribution of intrinsic motivation to IS security compliance behaviors,
relatively little research has been conducted within this paradigm (Herath and Rao, 2009a;
Padayachee, 2012), and there is a lack of theoretically driven approaches. Preston (1991)
specifically called upon information systems researchers to investigate the underlying
assumptions and theoretical constructs that shape their understanding. Thus, the objective of this
study is to develop a comprehensive model of intrinsic motivation and empirically test the role of
psychological empowerment (i.e., intrinsic motivation model) in mediating the relations between
structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance intentions. This study adopts
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model.
This chapter is organized into four sections. Section 3.2 describes how intrinsic
motivation theory can be applied in the context of IS security. Section 3.3 presents the
development of hypotheses. It is divided into three subsections: influences of psychological
empowerment on IS security policy compliance, drivers for psychological empowerment, and
psychological empowerment as mediator. Section 3.4 provides the conclusions of this chapter.
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3.2 Linking intrinsic motivation theory and IS security policy compliance
Thomas and Velthouse (1990) posited that “intrinsic motivation involves positively
valued experiences that the individual derives directly from the task” (p. 688). From the previous
chapter, Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory proposes that intrinsic motivation is a cognitive
assessment of four components of empowerment derived from a specific task: feelings of
competence, meaningfulness, impact, and choice of the task. Competence has been defined as
the belief in one’s capability to perform the task activities skillfully and successfully. For
example, individuals with the proper skills in an organization may feel confident about some
portion of the IS security task they choose to work on. Cognitive assessment of meaning relates
to an individual’s belief regarding the value of the task in relation to one’s personal beliefs,
specifically attitudes and values. In the context of this study, individuals in an organization may
identify with protective values and regard their performing IS security-related tasks as
meaningful. Impact refers to the belief that one can make a significant difference or contribute to
the organization in accomplishing the goal of the task. For instance, individuals in an
organization should consider if their IS security actions produce intended effects, such as a
reduction in the IS security breaches. Choice refers to a sense of freedom or autonomy to select
tasks that makes sense and perform in ways that seem appropriate, and being personally
responsible for the results. In the context of IS security, individuals may decide how they want to
carry out a given IS security task.
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) model of intrinsic motivation is grounded on the thesis
that individuals’ assessment of four dimensions of empowerment exerts influence on that
individuals’ feeling towards performing the task well (see also Oldham and Hackman, 1980;
Deci and Ryan, 1985). Prior studies have examined the direct effects of competence, meaning,
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impact, and choice of a task on individuals’ performance-related outcomes in organizational
contexts (e.g., Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000), as discussed in
previous chapter.
An assessment of positive feelings of competence, meaning, impact and choice of a task,
should motivate individuals to initiate actions. Although these feelings are innate to individuals
and derived from a specific task, these feelings must be enhanced by external factors (Thomas
and Velthouse, 1990; Ryan and Deci, 2000). One way an organization can stimulate these
feelings is the provision of structural empowerment. Structural empowerment refers to practices
that allow individuals to enhance their knowledge and skills through training and education
related to the task, access to information about strategy and goal, and participate in decisionmaking related to the task (Seibert et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2009; Logan and Ganster, 2007).
Educational efforts influence psychological empowerment in terms of increasing individual’s
belief in his/her capability to perform a specific task skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990;
Spreitzer, 2007). Decision making responsibility related to a task can enhance one’s perception
of meaningful, autonomy, and impact of the task (Spreitzer, 1996; Hon and Rensvold, 2006;
Logan and Ganster, 2007; Seibert et al., 2011). Furthermore, access to information about the
strategy and goals has been found to be associated with feelings of competence and
meaningfulness of the job (Spreitzer, 1996; Liao et al., 2009).
The notion of individuals’ feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and choice of a task
can be extended to IS security context for two reasons. First, tasks in IS security are similar to
job tasks in organizations, with activities and goals (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). IS security
tasks are defined as activities that protect the organisation’s information with the goals of
ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information (Loch et al., 1992).
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These activities include the appropriate use of computer hardware and software, the appropriate
selection of a password, the using and updating of anti-virus software, backing up of data,
appropriate use of e-mail and the internet, checking for encryptions, not sharing the computer
with others, etc. (Stanton et al., 2005; Albrechtsen, 2007; Dhillon, 2007; Herath and Rao, 2009a).
These IS security tasks to protect the information resources of a firm and are typically described
in IS security policies, which is part of the formal control structure in an organization (Dhillon,
1997; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Second, similar to other job tasks (e.g., payroll, teaching students,
serving customers, and so on) IS security tasks are important to organizations. In order for
employees to create value for their organization, they must complete these IS security tasks. For
instance, employees that create a strong password help to protect their organization from security
threats and vulnerabilities. It is through exerting effort and performing IS security tasks (e.g.,
complying with the IS security policy) that employees contribute to the organization and other
stakeholders.

3.3 The Research Model and Hypotheses
This section is divided into 3 subsections. The first subsection describes psychological
empowerment in the context of IS security and how it influences the intention to comply with an
IS security policy. The second subsection identifies the drivers that enhance the psychological
empowerment of employees. The third section explains the mediating role of psychological
empowerment between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance.
Influences of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance intentions
Extending Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model to the IS security
context, this study contends that psychological empowerment, which is conceptualized as
individuals’ belief regarding their ability to carry out the IS security tasks, individuals’ feelings
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of meaningfulness of the IS security tasks, individuals’ feelings of impact of their IS security
actions, and the freedom individuals’ feel in executing the IS security tasks, may help explain
individuals’ intention to execute and perform IS security efforts (i.e., compliance with IS security
policy).
Figure 0.1: Proposed Research Framework
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In addition, this study seeks to investigate how individuals’ psychological empowerment
can be enhanced through structural empowerment. Figure 3.1 illustrates the research framework.
It is proposed that employees’ innate feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and choice
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derived from the IS security tasks influence their intention to comply with the IS security policy.
Although these feelings are innate to individuals, they might be enhanced by structural
empowerment, through the three following mechanisms: (a) IS security education, training and
awareness (SETA), (b) access to IS security strategy and goals, and (c) participation in IS
security decision-making. Each of the constructs and its relations are discussed in the following
sections.
IS security policy compliance intention can be defined as individuals’ intention to
perform or execute the IS security tasks in order to protect information and technology resources
from potential security breaches (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). That is, individuals intent on
strengthening their IS security efforts by investing their time and energy to execute the IS
security tasks. Based on the theory of planned behavior (TBP), behavioral intention is a strong
indicator of an individual’s readiness to perform the actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, in this
research individuals’ intentions to comply with the IS security policy is the dependent variable.
Competence and IS security policy compliance intention
Perceived competence refers to one’s ability to perform a task (Bandura, 1977). When
individuals perceive that there have the competence and skills regarding a specific task, they will
engage and regulate their efforts in the task activities (Bandura, 1977). Further, the intrinsic
motivation theory purports that individuals are likely to put more effort and energy towards
completion of a task when they feel they are performing the task well (Thomas and Velthouse,
1990).
There is extensive research linking competence or self-efficacy on task-related behaviors
and actual performance (e.g., Stajkovic and Luthans, 1996; Hsu and Chiu, 2004; Ke and Zhang,
2011). In a meta-analysis, Stajkovic and Luthans (1996) assessed the impact of competence on
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task performance. Task performance was measured by the required acts necessary to perform the
task and the product of the task. The meta-analysis of 114 studies concluded that the relations
between competence and task performance was significant (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1996).
Perceived competence may also provide motivation for employees to engage in IT usage (Hsu
and Chiu, 2004; Ke and Zhang, 2011). A study conducted by Hsu and Chiu (2004) showed a
significant positive relations between users’ confidence in their skills of service on service usage.
Further, Ke and Zhang (2011), reported that perceived competence in an open source software
(OSS) task was found to be a significant predictor of OSS project participation. These findings
suggest that an individual who has confidence in the capability to undertake a task is more likely
to take the required associated actions.
With regards to IS security policy compliance, employees who have confidence in their
ability to carry out IS security tasks as prescribed in the IS security policy are more likely to have
positive feeling towards the IS security tasks. In return, the positive feeling increases their
motivation to take acts necessary to perform the IS security tasks. Some empirical studies have
examined the influences of perceived competence on IS security behaviors (e.g., Chan et al.,
2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath and Rao, 2009b; Rhee et al., 2009). For instance, Chan et al.
(2005) found that employees’ belief in their efficacy in IS security influences their decision to
perform IS security related activities, particularly those prescribed under an organizational IS
policy. More recently, Rhee et al. (2009) demonstrated that self-efficacy in IS security influences
individuals’ intention to strengthen their security efforts, use security protection software, and
other security compliance behaviors.
Consistent with self-efficacy theory, intrinsic motivation theory, and the findings of Chan
et al. (2005), Workman et al. (2008), Herath and Rao (2009b), and Rhee et al. (2009), it is
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expected that perceived competence of IS security tasks will encourage IS security task
performance in the form of IS security policy compliance. That is, employees do not approach IS
security tasks devoid of any presumptions about thier ability to successfully perform the tasks.
This prediction is formally recognized in the following hypothesis:
H1: Perceived competence in IS security tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply
with the requirements of the IS security policy
Meaning and IS security policy compliance intention
Meaning refers to judgments of the value of a task goal or purpose in relation to an
individual’s own ideals and standards (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Theory suggests that
individuals are more likely to engage, do well and exert energy into a task if the task activities
are meaningful, serve an important purpose, and are in accordance with their own values and
goals (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Individuals who believe that an assigned task is
meaningful are more likely to be motivated to invest their resources to accomplish the goal of the
task because by doing so, their goals are met.
Research has provided evidence that meaning is associated with numerous work-related
benefits, such as courtesy behavior, higher commitment to work, engagement at work, and work
performance (e.g., Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2005; Wang and Lee, 2009; May et al.,
2004). For example, Wat and Shaffer (2005) found that the perceived meaningfulness of a job
was a significant predictor of courtesy behaviors, which refer to actions taken to prevent problem
with other employees. This suggests that individuals who perceive that their job is meaningful
are motivated to engage in behavior that helps organization from work-related problems from
occurring, due to their commitment to the goals (Wat and Shaffer, 2005). Further feelings of
meaningfulness of a given work activity have been positively linked to employee engagement in
the associated work activities (May et al., 2004). A study by Wang and Lee (2009) found an
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increased propensity to commit to work when said work was perceived as personally meaningful.
Employees who believe that the work activities are personally meaningful were willing to invest
themselves more fully in the associated activities.
Regarding IS security policy compliance, employees who perceive that IS security tasks
as prescribed in the IS security policy are meaningful, are more likely to engage and perform the
tasks. For example, good or poor performance of IS security literally mean the difference
between survival and death for the organization (i.e., IS security breach may result in significant
loss, both monetary and nonmonetary, to the organization). If employees care about the survival
of their organization, they are likely to rate IS security tasks as highly meaningful to them, which
should increase intrinsic motivation to act in accordance with IS security policy. This indicates
that individuals who believe that IS security tasks serve a purpose, typically to help the
organization from IS security-related problems, which is incongruous with their value, are more
willing to exert effort into the task. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: Perceived meaningfulness of IS tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply with
the requirements of the IS security policy.
Impact and IS security policy compliance intention
Impact refers to the belief that one’s behavior or act to perform a task can make a
significant difference or contribute to an organization, especially in terms of accomplishing the
purpose of the task (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Per stewardship theory, it is expected that
individuals may be motivated to take action for collective benefits, such as for the well-being of
the organization, co-workers, and the communities in which they operate (Davis et al., 1997;
Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Such individuals engage in activities that are beneficial to others
because they believe that their actions will be able to influence and improve the organizational
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outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Herath and Rao, 2009a). Thus, there may also be intrinsic
motivation factors (i.e., perceived impact) to arrive at an outcome that benefits others.
Prior data provide evidence of the relations between perceived impact of acts to perform
a task and engagement as well as performing well with the task (e.g., Spreitzer et al., 1997;
Kraimer et al., 1999; Wang and Lee, 2009; Liao et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009; Agarwal and
Anderson, 2010). For example, Spreitzer et al. (1997) found that perceived impact significantly
related to work effectiveness, which is the degree to which individuals fulfill or exceed work
expectation. Furthermore, an empirical investigation by Kraimer et al. (1999) in the hospital
setting found that nurses’ belief in the impact of their job tasks influences their commitment to
the organization. Commitment refers to a strength of one’s involvement with a a particular
organization (Porter et al., 1974). These results indicate that individuals are willing to engage
and work hard in their job when they believe that their actions provide significant influence to
organizational outcomes.
In the IS security context, few researchers have considered a concept similar to perceived
impact (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Anderson and Agarwal, 2010). Herath and Rao (2009a)
considered perceived effectiveness as the belief of individuals that their IS security action can
make a difference and have impact on the overall organizational IS security goal. Anderson and
Agarwal (2010) considered perceived citizen efficacy as an individual’s belief that one’s actions
can make a difference in securing the Internet. Taken together, these studies concluded that the
relation between perceived impact and IS security behavior and intention to comply with
organizational IS security policy was significant. This suggests that individuals with a strong
belief that they can engage in IS security actions and behaviors that contribute to the betterment
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of others (e.g., organization, society) are more likely to undertake the prescribed and required IS
security actions or behaviors.
Consistent with the intrinsic motivation theory, stewardship theory, and the empirical
evidence, it is predicted that if employees believe that the IS security actions can have an impact
and influence on the organization IS security goals, they are motivated to carry out IS security
tasks in the form of the required IS security policy compliance behaviors. For example, if
employees believe that by creating a strong password, they will contribute to the IS security
goals, such as ensuring confidentiality of the information, they try hard to undertake the
password protection task (i.e. complying with password policy). Thus, it can be hypothesized
that:
H3: Perceived impact of IS security tasks positively affects one’s intention to comply with
the requirements of the IS security policies.
Choice and IS security policy compliance intention
Perceived choice refers to individual’ assessment of freedom or experience of selfdetermination in their actions of a specific task (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse,
1990). According to intrinsic motivation theory, when individuals experience a high degree of
choice regarding a task, they are aware that their views and insights related to the task matter
(Thomas, 2009). As a result, such individuals will feel a strong sense of ownership of the task
and feel a personal responsibility towards the outcomes of their decisions, and, thus, be more
likely to put more effort towards accomplishing the goals of the task (Thomas and Velthouse,
1990). Similarly, self-determination theory (SDT) holds that individuals have a psychological
need for self-determination. This need motivates individual to engage and accomplish tasks that
may provide them with a sense of self-determination (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci,
2000).
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Kraimer et al. (1999) defined self-determination at work as relating to an individual’s
identification with and involvement in a particular organization. Kraimer et al. (1999) found that
individuals who experience a sense of self-determination with their job were more committed to
the organization, by means of more involvement with the job. Similarly, Logan and Ganster
(2007) reported that self-determination of task significantly related to improved performance of
the task. Performance was measured by a composite of the frequency of accidents, breakdowns,
and maintenance expenses related to the task. This indicates that employees who experience a
high degree of discretion in carrying out their task feel a personal responsibility towards the
outcomes of the task. Consequently, they put more effort to improve the performance of the task.
In the IS literature, perceived choice has also been shown to have a significant impact on
open source software (OSS) projects (Ke and Zhang, 2011). The authors recorded that
individuals with a sense of autonomy in tasks related to an OSS project are more likely to expend
high levels of effort on the project tasks. In the context of IS security policy compliance in
organizations, if employees believe that their views and insights related to IS security task matter
and are the responsible decision makers that regulate their own IS security tasks, they are more
likely to carry out the prescribed IS security behaviors. Thus, perceived choice would translate
into accomplished IS security tasks by means of the effort expended on the required tasks.
Taking into account the above supporting evidence, it is hypothesized that:
H4: Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with
the requirements of the IS security policies
As a conclusion thus far, it is predicted that an intrinsically motivated employee
anticipates complying with the requirements of the IS security policy when he/she assesses the
intrinsic value experience (rewards) in term of feelings of competence, meaningfulness, impact,
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and choice, through the IS security task itself. Table 0.1 summarizes the four constructs of
psychological empowerment of IS security task and IS security policy compliance intentions.

Table 0.1: Summary of constructs
Construct

Definition

Sources

Sense of Competence

An employee’s assessment of personal skills, knowledge,
or competency about the IS security task.

Deci and Ryan (1985);
Thomas and Velthouse
(1990)

Sense of
Meaning

An employee’s assessment on how the goal or value of
the IS security task is significant to their own value.

Hackman and Oldham
(1980); Thomas and
Velthouse (1990)

Sense of Impact

An employee’s assessment on how the IS security task
can make a significant difference to the organization in
terms of accomplishing the goal of the IS security.

Hackman and Oldham
(1980); Thomas and
Velthouse (1990)

Sense of Choice
(Autonomy)

An employee’s assessment of freedom or experience selfdetermination in the IS security task.

Hackman and Oldham
(1980); Deci and Ryan
(1985); Thomas and
Velthouse (1990)

Intention to comply
with IS security
policy

An employee’s intention to execute the IS security task in
order to protect the information and technology resources
of the organization from potential security breaches.

Bulgurcu et al. (2009)

Drivers to enhance the psychological empowerment
As previously hypothesized, an employee’s perception of intrinsic motivation,
operationalized in terms of the four dimensions of psychological empowerment—sense of
competence, meaning, impact, and choice of IS security tasks—are antecedents of one’s IS
security policy compliance intention. This study also investigates how an employee forms these
perceptions. Theory and literature have acknowledged that perceptions of psychological
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empowerment may be influenced by factors external to individuals (Hackman and Oldham,
1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985: Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer, 1995a). Furthermore,
Maynard et al. (2012) urged researchers to determine potential factors that may serve as
antecedents to certain dimensions (and not to others) of psychological empowerment. Based on
Kanter’s (1977) work on structural empowerment, three factors were investigated (a) security
education, training and awareness (SETA) programs, (b) access to information about the strategy
and goals of organizational IS security, and (c) participation in IS security decision-making. The
following section explains how these factors enhance one’s intrinsic motivation.
Security Education, Training, and Awareness (SETA) and psychological empowerment
Intrinsic motivation theory purports that educational efforts contribute to individuals’
intrinsic motivation in terms of increasing their belief in their capability to perform task activities
skillfully (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 2007). Further, Bandura (1997)
proposed that self-efficacy beliefs are developed through “enactive mastery experiences that
serve as indicators of capability; vicarious experiences that alter efficacy beliefs through
transmission of competencies and comparisons with the attainments of others; verbal persuasion
and other types of social influence that one possesses certain capabilities; and physiological and
affective states from which people judge their capableness, strength, and vulnerability to
dysfunction” (p. 79). Accordingly, Agarwal et al. (2000) stated that training provides
opportunities for enactive mastery through the hands-on experience of a task, vicarious
experience by watching others perform a task, verbal persuasion through feedback on one’s
performance, and psychological and affective states induced by the interaction with a task, such
as stress and anxiety.
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There is extensive prior research linking training and education, and competence or selfefficacy (e.g., Gist et al., 1989; Agarwal et al., 2000; Liao et al., 2009). In a meta-analysis study,
Seibert et al. (2011) examined the impact of training on perceived competence. The authors
concluded that employees’ feelings of competence in work roles were reflected by enhanced
knowledge, skills, and abilities resulting from the training programs. Extensive training may also
enhance employees’ confidence in their competence in service tasks (Liao et al., 2009). In an
experiment with 108 managers and administrators in a university, Gist et al. (1989) found a
significant positive relations between training of computer and software, and computer and
software self-efficacy. Further, Karsten and Roth (1998) reported that training experience is
associated with student perceptions of their ability to use computers effectively. These findings
suggest that within a training environment, individuals are progressively provided with greater
opportunity for learning, experience, and practice with a particular task, computer or software,
and over time, develop self-efficacy regarding the task, computer or software.
In the IS security context, security, education, training and awareness (SETA) programs
focus on providing users with general knowledge of IS security environment, along with the
skills necessary to perform the required IS security tasks (Whitman et al., 2001; Lee and Lee,
2002; c.f. D’Arcy et al., 2009). The content and scope of the SETA program may vary. For
example, SETA programs could include information on day-to-day physical security issues, the
certainty and severity of penalties, the range of technical and managerial controls to cope with
systems risks, and how this information can be used to take actions (Straub and Welke, 1998;
Furnell et al., 2002). From a different perspective, Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) suggested
that IS security training should consider the individuals’ past knowledge of IS security policy
compliance. Irrespective of the specific content of these programs, the main reason for SETA
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programs is to review the IS security policies and educate employees on how best to protect
organizational information systems (Straub and Welke, 1998, Harris, 2010). This can take the
form of various efforts, including reviewing media reports of recent security attacks on other
companies and discussing how those companies could have avoided the attacks, showing a
security video, a combination of courses, seminars, handouts, directives, reminders, and
newsletters (Murray, 1991; Mitnick, 2002).
Three out of the four sources of information that are considered essential to self-efficacy
(Bandura, 1977) will be able to obtain from a SETA program. For example, individuals gather
personal mastery of IS security via hands-on exercises and activities of IS security or regular
demonstration of IS security issues and respective countermeasures. Further, SETA provides
opportunities to observe the successes and failures of other IS security behaviors. Consequently,
this information provides a guideline to employees against which they compare their own selfefficacy (Gist et al., 1989). In addition, verbal persuasion is regularly delivered in a SETA
program. Individuals receive suggestions from instructors that encourage and support their IS
security skills and foster a responsible development. Thus, it is expected that self-efficacy in IS
security may be developed through the ongoing acquisition of knowledge related to IS security,
such as knowledge about IS security issues, the consequences, the controls to cope with the
issues, and how to take action when such issues occur through SETA. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H5: SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perception of competence of IS
security tasks
Access to organizational IS security strategy and goals and psychological empowerment
Hoffman (1994), in the context of emerging information technology (IT), stated that, “to
support worker empowerment throughout our enterprise we will be prepared to provide every
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worker with all information relevant to that worker’s job regardless of its effect on the company
as a whole” (Hoffman, 1994, p. 55). Information might include data about a firm’s strategy and
goals (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1996). Liao et al. (2009) asserted that an employee’s experiences
of a HPWS, including information sharing, might assist an employee in perceiving the service
tasks as meaningful and important. Information about a strategy or operational goals allows
employees to see their work as personally meaningful because they understand how it fits into
their organization’s goals and strategies (Seibert et al., 2011). In other words, access to
information about strategy and goals allows an individual to see the “big picture” and hence
creates and understanding on how one’s work can contribute to organizational goals (Bowen and
Lawler, 1992). The broader research into the effect of access to information regarding
organizational strategy and goals supports this view as well. For instance, Spreitzer (1996)
showed that providing access to information about the strategy and goals of an organization
enhances employee knowledge about the direction of the organization. As a result, employees
felf confident in how their work roles can contribute to these goals. In support of this, a metaanalysis by Seibert et al. (2011) concluded that there was a significant relation between HPWS,
including sharing of information about organizational strategy and goals and the four dimensions
of psychological empowerment.
Accordingly, in the context of this study, access to an organization’s IS security strategy
and goals denotes the extent to which the work structure provides opportunities for employees to
obtain and understand the organization’s IS security strategic information, objectives, and goals.
This could be accomplished by communicating a IS security policy that consists of the goals
regarding IS security (Straub, 1990; Boss et al., 2009). Access to information regarding an IS
security strategy and goals should allow individuals to feel informed about where an
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organization is headed in the context of IS security. When employees understand the direction in
which the organization is heading, they tend to be more aware about how their own IS security
tasks contribute to achieving the stated IS security goals. That is, employees acquire a greater
sense that the IS security task is meaningful to be executed because they know that their IS
security task is supporting the IS security goals and benefit the organization. Thus, access to an
organization’s IS security strategy and it’s associated goals is expected to correlate with
perceived meaning. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H6: Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively associated
with one’s perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
Participation in IS security decision-making and psychological empowerment
Participation in decision-making refers to the act of sharing decision-making with others
to achieve organizational goals (Knoop, 1995). Thus, participation in decision-making indicates
that employees at all levels are able to provide input and influence over decisions related to a
specific task or job (Cotton et al., 1988). In the context of IS security, participation relates to an
individual’s involvement in the IS security decision-making process. Spears and Barki (2010)
defined participation in security risk management (SRM) as a set of activities assigned to
individuals during risk assessment, design, and implementation of IS security controls. SRM
comprises of strategies, policies, roles, and procedures to manage the security risks (Spears and
Barki, 2010). Participation in IS security decision-making should allow individuals to contribute
their inputs and thoughts pertinent to the IS security in order to achieve the organizational IS
security goals. Fostering participation in decision-making in turn strengthens the motivation of
employees to engage in IS security-related behaviors by providing them with the opportunity to
attain intrinsic rewards from their work, including a greater experience of self-determination,
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meaningfulness, and impact (Scandura et al., 1986; Manz and Sims Jr, 1987; Lawler, 1992;
Spreitzer, 1996).
When employees are involved in decision-making processes related to IS security tasks,
they have the opportunity to contribute their inputs, such as ideas and thoughts, to accomplish
the goals of the IS security policy. Thus, participation allows employees to feel that they have the
opportunity for freedom and independence for IS security task-related decisions. Participation is
an influential source of self-determination because it provides evidence that ones’ inputs,
thoughts, contribution, and activities related to their job matter (Lawler, 1992; Spreitzer, 1996).
In a case study setting in IS security, Dhillon et al. (2004) found that most employees in an
organization did not feel a sense of freedom because they were left out from all major decisionmaking and had no say on the latest developments related to IS security in the organization.
In addition, greater participation might be the impetus to enhance individuals’ feeling of
impact (Seibert et al., 2011). When employees participate in the decision-making process related
to their IS security task, they have the opportunity to set decisions jointly with the superiors. This
likely influences the extent to which employees feel that they can impact their work
environment. Spreitzer (1996) provided empirical evidence of the relations between participation
in decision-making and perceived impact. The study concluded that participation signals to the
employees that they are an important asset of the organization and that they can impact, or make
a significant difference to the organization (Spreitzer, 1996). Further, when employees are
allowed to participate in the decision-making process related to their IS security task, they have
the opportunity to provide input that is consistent with their own values or needs. That is, the IS
security task is shaped by their own values and needs. Because of this, they are more likely to
perceive that the IS security tasks are meaningful and important. Hon and Rensvold (2006) has
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provided evidence showing that participation was strongly related to perceived meaning of a
task. Collectively, it is thus expected that if employees involved in decision-making processes
related to the IS security tasks, they have opportunities to contribute their input to accomplish the
IS security objectives and affect the work environment. Consequently, their perceptions of
meaning, impact, and choice of the IS security tasks should be higher. This predicted effect is
formally recognized in the following hypotheses:
H7: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived
meaning of IS security tasks.
H8: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived
impact of IS security tasks.
H9: Participation in IS security decision-making is positively associated with perceived
choice of IS security tasks.
Mediating effect of dimensions of psychological empowerment
The above nine hypotheses combine to form a mediation model. It signifies that the
psychological empowerment dimensions (i.e., feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and
choice) mediate the relations between the structural empowerment facets (i.e., SETA, access to
IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making) and the intention
to comply with organizational IS security policy.
In the context of this study, psychological empowerment reflects how individuals feel
about their self-determination over their IS security task-related decisions, their IS security task
competence, and their sense of meaning and impact of the IS security tasks. Based on the
previously presented arguments, it is expected that psychological empowerment is influenced by
organizational practices that provide opportunities to nurture self-efficacy through IS security
training, get involved in IS security decision-making processes, and access information about the
IS security strategy and it’s goals. In return, the increased feelings of empowerment that
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individuals receive motivate them to perform well with the IS security tasks, measured by their
IS security policy compliance intentions.
Prior studies provide evidence that elements of structural empowerment are associated
with psychological empowerment, which in turn are related to work related performance
(Spreitzer, 2007). For instance, training influences employees’ task performance by empowering
them to feel competent (Gist and Mitchell, 1992; Seibert et al., 2011). Thus, it is expected that
employees develop a sense that their capability to perform IS security-related tasks that increases
their IS security task performance as a consequence of SETA programs. Further, access to
information can affect task performance through psychological empowerment by giving
employees the perception that their work tasks are meaningful (Spreitzer, 1996). In the context of
this study, it is predicted that access to IS security strategy and its goals influences employee IS
security task performance by empowering employees to feel how their IS security tasks would
contribute to achieving the IS security goals. Meta-analytic research has provided evidence that
participation in decision-making can motivate employees to perform well through psychological
empowerment by giving employees the perception that they have a choice and have an impact in
their work (Seibert et al., 2011). Thus, employees feel that the IS security task is self-determined,
has meaning, and is impactful when they are involved in the IS security task decision-making
process. Consequently, their intention to comply and engage in IS security tasks should increase.
Taken together, different dimensions of psychological empowerment may mediate the relations
between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance intentions.
H10: Perceived competence mediates the relations between SETA and one’s intention to
comply with the IS security policy.
H11: Perceived meaning mediates the relations between access to information regarding
IS security strategy and goals, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.
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H12a: Perceived meaning mediates the relations between participation in IS security
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.
H12b: Perceived impact mediates the relations between participation in IS security
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.
H12c: Perceived choice mediates the relations between participation in IS security
decision-making, and one’s intention to comply with the IS security policy.

3.4 Conclusion
This chapter started by explaining how the theory of intrinsic motivation can be applied
to explain IS security policy compliance behavior. Following this discussion, a conceptual
framework and specific hypotheses were developed based on Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990)
intrinsic motivation theory and Kanter’s (1977) structural empowerment theory. Table 0.2
summarizes the hypotheses. The proposed conceptual framework will be tested in Chapter 5
using the data gathered in this study.
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Table 0.2: Summary of Proposed Hypotheses

Hypotheses

Description

H1

Perceived competence of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the
IS security policies.

H2

Perceived meaningfulness of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with
the IS security policies.

H3

Perceived impact of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the IS
security policies.

H4

Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to comply with the IS
security policies.
SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perceived competence of IS security task.

H5
H6

Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively associated with one’s
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.

H7

Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived
meaningfulness of IS security task.

H8

Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived
impact of IS security task.

H9

Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s perceived
freedom of IS security task.

H10

The effect of SETA on one’s intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by
perceived competence of IS security task.

H11

The effect of access to IS security strategy and goals on one’s intention to comply with IS
security policies is mediated by perceived competence and meaningfulness of IS security task.

H12a

The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS
security policies is mediated by perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.

H12b

The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS
security policies is mediated by perceived impact of IS security task.

H12c

The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s intention to comply with IS
security policies is mediated by perceived choice of IS security task.

H13

The interaction of access to IS security strategy and goals and participation in IS security
decision-making is related to perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has identified the theoretical background of this research and
subsequently developed the research framework (see Figure 3.1). The proposed research
framework has been designed to explore the relations among structural empowerment facets,
psychological empowerment dimensions, and IS security policy compliance intentions. This
chapter describes the methodology used to assess the proposed relations. The remainder of this
section presents the research population and sample, the data collection procedures, the
measures, and the data analysis approach.

4.2 Research population and sample
As the primary thrust of this study is to investigate the relations between individuals’
perception of psychological empowerment related to IS security tasks and IS security policy
compliance intention at the workplace, employees in different jobs and levels were thought to be
appropriate as the target population. The unit of analysis is individual and the conveniencesampling technique was used as the sampling strategy. The convenience sampling is a sampling
procedure to obtain people who are easily available (Zikmund, 2000). Specifically, the
respondents in this study were MBA, Executive MBA, and Executive MIS students enrolled in
two public universities in the US. The rationale of selecting students in the US as a sample are
because the researcher herself is a student in the US, which has enabled easy access to the data
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sources; and to obtain a larger number of completed questionnaires quickly and economically
(Zikmund, 2000). The limitations of using a student sample is discussed later in chapter 7.
Hair et al. (2010) recommended a sample size in the range of 100 to 400 as appropriate to
run data using structural equation modeling (SEM). Other researchers have claimed that a sample
size of 300 is enough (e.g., Comrey and Lee, 1992; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). This, however,
is subject to other considerations such as the number of constructs and items (Hair et al., 2010).
Nunnally (1978) suggested that in SEM estimation, a good rule is to have at least ten times as
many subjects as variables. In MIS research that used SEM, the rule of thumb of 10 cases per
indicator in setting a lower bound of sample size was widely used (Westland, 2010). Therefore,
this study has attempted to yield approximately 250 or above usable samples in order to satisfy
the statistical recommendations of 10 cases per indicator, based on twenty-five items in the
questionnaire.

4.3 Data collection procedures
This study is a cross-sectional study because the data was collected at a single point in
time. The data were collected using a self-administered survey, where the researcher
administered the questionnaires in classes or sent through e-mail to graduate students. Zikmund
(2003) stated that self-administered questionnaires could be widely distributed to a large number
of respondents with minimal cost compared to other types of data collection. Another strength of
this method is that respondent confidentiality and anonymity can be assured (Davis, 2000).
The instructors for the MBA, the Executive MBA, and the Executive MIS programs were
contacted to ask for permission to distribute the questionnaire in their classes. Once permission
was granted, the researcher attended the classes and explained to the students the purpose of the
study. Then, the questionnaire and a cover letter explaining the purpose of the study, the
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information about voluntariness, confidentiality, and anonymity were distributed. With the help
of the instructors, the questionnaires were collected after class. In addition, the students were
able to submit the completed questionnaires in a box at the graduate student office. Some
instructors allocated 20 to 30 minutes of the class time for the students to immediately answer
the questionnaires. This helped to increase the response rate.
For some classes, a web survey was distributed to students by e-mail sent directly by the
instructors. The web survey was prepared using the Google doc survey tool. The e-mail stated
the purpose of the study and asked students to complete the survey. The students were able to
access the survey through clicking the survey site URL (hyperlink) embedded within the e-mail.
In both methods (paper and pencil and electronic), respondents were required to answer a set of
exclusion criteria questions to determine whether a person should participate in a research study
or whether he/she should be excluded in a systematic review. The exclusion questions were: (1)
How long you have been working with the current organization; (2) Is your organization has IS
security policy; and (3) Do you aware of the requirements of the IS security policy? This criteria
help to identify suitable participants that are currently employed and have knowledge about their
organization’s IS security policy.
Overall, 410 surveys (paper and pencil and electronic) were distributed to the participants
and 326 complete responses were returned within five months. The final response rate for the
survey data collection was 79.5%. Detailed response profiles are reported in Chapter 5, in
addition to an evaluation of missing data, an assessment of normality, an examination of outliers,
and an assessment of common method variance.
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4.4 Measurement of constructs
Reliability is a test of the consistency and repeatability of the items to measure a
construct (Zikmund, 2003). One of the common methods to assess the reliability of a measure is
an average of split-half correlation (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha, α) with a cut-off value of .7
(Zikmund, 2003). The following section defines and describes the measures to assess the
constructs in the proposed research framework. All measures were adapted from previously
validated studies. All the questionnaire items were self-assessments and used seven-point Likerttype scales with anchors ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
IS security policy compliance intentions. IS security policy compliance intentions refer
to the extent to which employees intend to perform the IS security tasks in order to protect the
information and technology resources of the organization from potential security breaches. The
compliant behaviors do not imply that one security behavior is better than the other, but
involvement in one or more behaviors can help mitigate security breaches, thus improving
organizational IS security performance. Three items were used from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) to
measure IS security policy compliance intentions. For instance, respondents were asked how
much do they agree or disagree with statements, such as “I intend to comply with the
requirements of the IS security policy of my organization,” “I intend to protect information and
technology resources according to the requirements of the IS security policy of my
organization,” and “I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the IS security policy
of my organization when I use information and technology.” Likert-type scale with response
options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The measure had an acceptable
level of internal consistency (α = .75).
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Psychological empowerment. In order to assess the appropriateness of using the
individual dimensions of psychological empowerment instead of a single, global psychological
empowerment construct, consistent with previous research, CFAs was used. These CFAs shown
that the hypothesized four-factor model (χ2 = 91.45 with df = 48; RMSEA=.056; SRMR = .047;
CFI = .98; NFI = .96) fit the data better than a model with one construct (χ2 = 111.85 with df =
50; RMSEA=.066; SRMR = .075; CFI = .97; NFI = .95). These results are consistent with
previous research that showed that the four dimensions of psychological empowerment are
distinct (e.g. Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). Further, a chi-square difference test was
performed and the result confirms that the models are different (p < .05). Thus, the four
individual facets of psychological empowerment, feelings of competence, meaning, impact, and
choice, were used to separately test the hypotheses.
Competence. This measure captures the employees’ perception regarding their personal
skills and competence about IS security tasks. Specifically, the items represent the extent to
which employees feel confidence in their ability to master the skills needed to protect the
organizational information. Three items were adapted from Spreitzer (1995a) to measure
perceived competence. Respondents were asked how much do they agree or disagree with
statements, such as “I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing information and
information systems” and “I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of securing
information and information systems activities.” Likert-type scale with response options ranged
from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale has a high level of internal consistency
reliability (α = .89).
Meaning. Meaning captures the extent to which employees perceive the value of the IS
security tasks as significant to their own value. Perceptions of meaning was measured using three
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items from Spreitzer (1995a). Respondents were asked to specify the degree to which they
agreed or disagreed with a set of statements using a likert-type scale with response options
ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. Items included, “My work of securing
information and information systems is very important to me,” “My work of securing
information and information systems is personally meaningful to me,” and “My work of securing
information and information systems is meaningful to me.” The scale had a high level of internal
consistency reliability (α = .91).
Impact. Perceived impact is an employee’s assessment on how performing the IS
security tasks can make a significant difference to the organization in terms of accomplishing the
goal of IS security. More specifically, this construct captures the extent to which employees feel
that their action related to IS security affects the organization. Perceived impact from the
employees’ perspective was measured using three items from Spreitzer (1995a). As an example,
respondents were asked to what degree to which they agreed or disagreed with “my impact of
what happens in my department related to IS security is large” and “I have significant influence
over what happens in my department related to IS security.” Likert-type scale with response
options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale had a high level of
internal consistency (α = .90).
Choice. Perceived choice is an employee’s assessment on how he/she has experience a
sense of choice in initiating and regulating the IS security tasks. Perceived choice was measured
from the employee perspective, using three items from Spreitzer (1995a). For instance,
respondents were asked to specify the degree to which they agree or disagree with a set of
statements, such as “I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of securing
information and information systems” and “I have considerable opportunity for independence
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and freedom in how I do my job of securing information and information systems.” Likert-type
scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale
had an acceptable level of internal consistency (α = .78).
Security education, training and awareness (SETA). The SETA measure was created
to assess the employees’ perceptions regarding the amount of education, training and awareness
of the IS security breaches and the counter-measures the employees receive from the
organization. SETA was measured using five items from D’Arcy et al. (2009). Respondents were
asked to what degree they agree or disagree with various statements, such as “I receive training
to help me improve my awareness of computer and IS security issues,” “I am briefed on the
consequences of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way,” and “I receive an
education on my computer security responsibilities.” Likert-type scale with response options
ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale had an acceptable level of
reliability (α = .88).
Access to IS security strategy and goals. Three items, adapted from Spreitzer (1995a),
were used to assess employees’ perceptions of the extent of access they have to strategic
information related to IS security in the organization. As an illustration, respondents were asked
to specify the extent to which they agree or disagree with statements, such as “I have access to
the strategic information I need to do my job of securing information and information systems
well” and “I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the organization.” Likert-type
scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The scale
showed an acceptable level of internal consistency (α = .76).
Participation in IS security decision-making. The scale to assess participation in
decision-making related to IS security was used to assess employees’ perceptions of their
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involvement in defining, reviewing or approving IS security control, as well as how well they
can contribute to the risk management activities in the organization. Two items to measure
participation were adapted from Spears and Barki (2010). Respondents were asked to specify the
extent to which they agree or disagree with statements, including “I actively participate in
defining, reviewing or approving any IS security controls related to protecting the organization’s
information” and “In managing risk to information and information systems in my company, I
actively perform, or contribute to decision-making in any risk management activities.” Likerttype scale with response options ranged from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree. The
scale had an acceptable level of reliability (α = .78). A summary of the variables investigated in
this dissertation is included in Table 0.1.
Common method variance
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003, p. 879), “method variance refers to the variance that
is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the construct of interest.” Common
method variance (CMV), one of the sources of measurement errors, can have serious influences
on the observed relations between the predictor and outcome variables in organizational and
behavioral research (Podsakoff et al., 2003). CMV may occur when data is collected by one
method or at a single point of time. When data is collected in such a way, the variance that the
items have in common with each other may be due to the collection method, rather than to the
relations between the items and their respective constructs or the relations among the constructs.
In order to control for CMV, Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested two techniques: (1) procedural
remedies and (2) statistical control.
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Table 0.1: Measurement items and the source
Variable

PACT1

Source
Bulgurcu et al.
I intend to comply with the requirements of the ISP of my organization in the future.
(2010)
I intend to protect information and technology resources according to the requirements of Bulgurcu et al.
the ISP of my organization in the future.
(2010)
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the ISP of my organization when I
Bulgurcu et al.
use information and technology in the future.
(2010)
My impact of what happens in my department related to IS security is large.
Spreitzer (1995a)

PACT2

I have a great deal of control over what happens in my department related to IS security.

Spreitzer (1995a)

PACT3

Spreitzer (1995a)

MEAN1

I have significant influence over what happens in my department related to IS security.
I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing information and information
systems.
I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of securing information and
information systems activities.
I have mastered the skills necessary for my job of securing information and information
systems.
My work of securing information and information systems is very important to me.

MEAN2

My work of securing information and information systems is personally meaningful to me. Spreitzer (1995a)

MEAN3

My work of securing information and information systems is meaningful to me.
I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of securing information and
information systems.
I can decide on my own how to go about doing my job of securing information and
information systems.
I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do my job of
securing information and information systems.
I receive training to help me improve my awareness of computer and information security
issues.

ISPC1
ISPC2
ISPC3

COMP1
COMP2
COMP3

CHOI1
CHOI2
CHOI3
SETA1

Item

SETA2

I receive education on computer software copyright laws.

SETA3

I am briefed on the consequences of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.

SETA4

I receive education on my computer security responsibilities.

SETA5
ACC1
ACC2
ACC3
PART1

PART2

I am briefed on the consequences of accessing computer systems that I am not authorized
to use.
I have access to the strategic information I need to do my job of securing information and
information systems well.
I understand top management's IS security vision of the organization.
I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the organization.
I actively participate in defining, reviewing or approving any IS security controls related
to protecting the organization's information (e.g. access control, separation of duties,
employee training on IS security awareness and etc.)
In managing risk to information and information systems in my company, I actively
perform, or contribute to decision-making in any risk management activities (e.g.
documenting business processes or transactions for risk evaluation, ensuring key
controls exist to mitigate specific types of risks, implementing control and etc.)
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Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)

Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)
Spreitzer (1995a)
D’Arcy et al.
(2009)
D’Arcy et al.
(2009)
D’Arcy et al.
(2009)
D’Arcy et al.
(2009)
D’Arcy et al.
(2009)
Spreitzer (1996)
Spreitzer (1996)
Spreitzer (1996)
Spears and Barki
(2010)
Spears and Barki
(2010)

Procedural remedies are aiming to minimize or mitigate CMV between predictor and
criterion variables through the design of the research. First, CMV can be controlled by obtaining
different sources for independent variable (IV) and dependent variables (DV) (Podsakoff et al.,
2003). Therefore, the measures for the DV (IS security policy compliance intentions) and the IVs
(dimensions of psychological empowerment and structural empowerment) should be collected
from different sources. However, this option was not practical for this study due to time and
resource constraints. In addition, it might not be appropriate in this research setting because
students were used as the respondents. If the data were collected in an actual organizational
setting, the researcher could have collected information from the employees (IVs) and
management or supervisors (DV).
Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested a temporal separation in collecting the IV and the DV.
To do this, a longitudinal study that involves a series of measurement for a period of time should
be used. However, as this research used a cross-sectional design rather than a longitudinal
approach, both the IVs and DV were measured at the same point in time, due to time and
resources constraints. Another reason for the used of a cross-sectional design was to ensure
anonymity of the respondents. If the collection of IVs and DV are separated, researchers need to
apply some kind of method to link the data from the different time periods, which can
compromise the anonymity. Protection of respondents’ anonymity is another method to control
for common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Anonymity allows respondents to answer
as honestly as possible. Consequently, they are less likely to respond based on social desirability
or what the researcher wants. Thus, this study used this technique wherein respondents’ identities
were not collected. The counterbalancing question order is another method suggested by
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to reduce CMV. This technique requires that the items for the same
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construct are not clustered together. This is to reduce the item-context-induced mood state
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). This technique was used to reduce CMV. To ensure the items were
grouped back into their specific construct for the data analysis purpose, each item was assigned a
unique identifier.
Although a substantial effort has been made during the design stage to reduce CMV using
two procedural remedies, Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggested that it may be useful to use one of
the statistical remedies to minimize, if not totally eliminate, the effect of CMV. Researchers use
many statistical remedies to control for CMV, such as Harman’s single-factor test, partial
correlation procedures designed to control for method biases, controlling for the effects of a
single unmeasured latent method factor, and use of multiple-method factors to control method
variance etc. (Podsakoff et al., 2003).
Harman’s single-factor test is one of the most widely used techniques to address the issue
of CMV (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Conventionally, researchers load all the variables in the study
into an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and examine the unrotated factor solution to determine
the number of factors that are necessary to account for the variance in the variables (Podsakoff et
al., 2003). This technique assumes that CMV exists if a single factor will emerge from the
analysis or one general factor will account for the majority of the covariance among the variables
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). More recently, some researchers have used confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) as a more sophisticated method to test of the hypothesis that a single factor accounts for
all the variance in the data (Iverson and Maguire, 2000; Korsgaard and Roberson, 1995;
Mossholder, Bennett, Kemery, and Wesolowski, 1998 cf. Podsakoff et al., 2003). Harman’s
single-factor was used to statistically assess the possibility the CMV has affected the reported
results (see section 5.2).
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4.5 Analysis of data
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the measurement model and to
test the hypotheses of the proposed research model. Empirical studies show that the use of SEM
is widespread in information systems research (Gefen et al., 2000). SEM, a multivariate
statistical technique, is a powerful quantitative data analytical tool that enables researchers to
observe the structural element (path model) and measurement element (factor model)
simultaneously (Gefen et al., 2000). Hair et al. (2010) stated that SEM is most appropriate when
the research has multiple constructs that can be differentiated as DVs and IVs, and each construct
is assessed with multiple items. Unlike other multivariate techniques, SEM can handle constructs
that act as the IV in one relations and as the DV in another relations, and the relations can be run
simultaneously (Hair et al., 2010). AMOS version 18 was used. Following Hair et al. (2010), this
study used the six stage decision process of SEM as shown in Figure 0.1 below.
Stage 1 involves the process of defining the individual constructs. At this stage, a
researcher operationalizes a construct by selecting scale items and the scale type (Hair et al.,
2010). In this study, items and scales were obtained from prior research studies (section 4.4).
Stage 2 involves the development and specification of the measurement model. A key element in
this process is the labeling of indicators, constructs, and error terms, and specifying the relations
between items and constructs, and among the constructs (Hair et al., 2010). Using AMOS
version 18, a measurement model for this study was developed (see Figure 9.1). The
measurement model represents the relations between the latent constructs (unobserved variables)
and measured variables (observed variables or indicators). The observed variables are
represented by rectangles, constructs are represented by ovals, and measurement error is depicted
by small circles.
80

At stage 3, a researcher is required to discuss the issues of research design and model
estimation. In the area of research design, careful consideration should be given to the type of
data to be analyzed, impact and remedy of missing data, and impact of sample size (Hair et al.,
2010). As recommended by Hair et al. (2010), covariance matrices were used to analyze the data.
Next, one must address the issue of missing data, which could affect the generalizability of the
obtained results (Hair et al., 2010). A missing data pattern should be identified to determine an
appropriate treatment for the missing data. In doing this, the percentage of variables with missing
data for each case and the number of cases with missing data for each variable was tabulated.
The analysis was performed with the Missing Value Analysis (MVA) module in SPSS. During
this analysis, variables and cases that would be possible candidates for deletion were identified,
depending on the severity of the missing percentage (Hair et al., 2010). After that, diagnosis for
the randomness of the missing data was performed to determine whether the missing data are
distributed randomly across the cases and variables (Hair et al., 2010). The analysis of
randomness provides insights into the appropriate remedy methods. Hair et al. (2010) suggested
four basic methods, namely the complete case approach, all-available approach, imputation
approach, and model-based approach. Detailed analysis for missing data is presented in section
5.2.
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Figure 0.1: Stages of Structural Equation Modeling

Note: adopted from Hair et al. (2010)

Stage 4 contains a process of assessing the validity of the measurement model. This stage
seeks to provide empirical support for the relations between the measured variables and the latent
constructs (i.e., the model). SEM uses two tests to achieve this. The first is construct validity and
the second is to test for acceptable levels of goodness-of-fit for the measurement model (Hair et
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al., 2010). Construct validity is whether the measured variables (items) related to a specific latent
construct are really measuring the latent construct as theoretically predicted. Two types of
construct validity are convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is
whether the indicator items of a specific latent construct converge or share a very high
proportion of variance. CFA outputs provide a range of information to evaluate convergent
validity, such as factor loadings and average variance extracted (AVE). Factor loadings examine
the size of loadings of each of the items to the latent construct. A rule of thumb is that
standardized loading estimates should be .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2010; Klein, 2011). AVE may
be estimated to provide additional information for the convergent validity (Hair et al, 2010).
AVE is calculated as the mean variance extracted for the items loading on a construct, with a rule
of thumb of .5 or higher (Hair et al, 2010). An AVE of higher than .5 indicate that, on average,
more variance in the items explained by the latent construct than error remains in the items (Hair
el al., 2010).
Discriminant validity is whether a construct is truly distinct from other constructs in the
model. Discriminant validity shows that a construct is unique and captures a phenomenon other
constructs do not. For discriminant validity, Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) test was conducted.
This test compares the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct with
the correlations associated with that construct. AVE is the mean of the variance extracted for the
items loading on a construct. To provide evidence that a construct has discriminant validity, the
square root AVE should be greater in value than the correlation coefficients. That is, the variance
that uniquely belongs to the construct should be greater than the variance shared between the
constructs (Hair et al., 2010).
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The next step is to assess the overall fit of the measurement model. Evaluation of fit, or
goodness-of-fit (GOF), is a comparison between theory and reality by measuring the similarity
between the observed (the proposed model) and estimated (the data) covariance matrices among
the indicator items. In other words, the purpose of GOF is to check whether the proposed model
explains the data or not, and if any modification is needed to improve the model fit (Kline,
2011). Hair et al. (2010) identify three classes of GOF measures:
•
•
•

Absolute measures
Incremental measures
Parsimony fit measures

There are various fit indices produced by SEM (e.g., Chi-Square (χ²) Statistic,
comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), standardized
root mean square residual (SRMR) with a different minimum or maximum value of good fit
were used as the rule of thumb (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Byrne, 2009; Hair et al. 2010). However,
it is unlikely to find research that reports all of those fit indexes. In fact, different fit indices were
reported in different research articles in the IS domain (Gefen et al., 2000). Hair et al. (2010)
asserted that it is not necessary to report all the indices to provide an assessment of fit, and
suggested that researchers should rely on at least one absolute index and one incremental index
in addition to the χ² Statistic. Kline (2011) advocates the use of the χ² test, the RMSEA, the CFI,
and the SRMR.
Absolute Fit Indices is the most direct measure to assess on how well a proposed model
fits the data (Kline, 2011; Byrne, 2009). The χ² statistic is looking for no difference between
covariance matrices of the proposed model and the data (i.e., the lower the χ² the better) (Hu and
Bentler, 1999). A good model fit would provide an insignificant result (p > .05), that is, the null
hypothesis fails to be rejected (Hu and Bentler, 1999). However, since the mathematical
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properties of χ² has sample size, the value of χ² is affected by the sample size. This means that
the greater the sample size, the higher the value of χ². Due to the limitation of χ² related to
sample size, researchers have sought alternative indices to assess model fit. CMIN (χ² /df) is a
statistic that minimizes the impact of sample size on the χ² statistic. Although there is no
consensus regarding an acceptable ratio for this statistic, a value below 2.0 indicates a very good
fit (Byrne, 2009; Kline, 2011).
Another fit measure that can deal with the issue of sample size sensitivity of the χ²
statistic is the RMSEA. RMSEA adjusts for both model complexity and sample size by including
each in its computation (Hair et al., 2010). RMSEA is regarded as the most widely used measure
and the most informative fit index (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000; Hair et al., 2010). Low
values indicate a better fit. Hu and Bentley (1999) suggested cut-off value lower than .06 for
RMSEA. Still, values as high as .08 may be acceptable (Hu and Bentler, 1999). In addition,
Browne and Cudeck (1989) also suggested that values in the range of .05 to .08 indicate a fair fit,
and that values greater than .10 indicate poor fit. One of the advantages of RMSEA is that it can
report range values for a given level of confidence (e.g. 95% confidence). This study applies the
cut-off value of .08.
The root mean square residual (RMR) and SRMR assess to the square root of the
difference between the sample covariance matrix and the proposed covariance model. The RMR
is an average of the covariance residuals whereas SRMR adjusts for the scale of the covariances
(Hair et al., 2010). According to Byrne (2009,) the value for SRMR ranges from zero to 1.0, with
well-fitting models obtaining values less than .05. Still, values as high as .08 may be acceptable
(Hu and Bentler, 1999). Thus, this study applies a cut-off value of .08.
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Another group of statistics to measure the fit of the model are incremental fit indices,
such as the incremental fit index (IFI), the Tucker Lewis index (TLI), and the comparative fit
index (CFI). Incremental fit indices differ from absolute fit indices in that they assess how well
the estimated model fits any alternative baseline model (i.e., the null model) (Hair et al., 2010).
Null model is hypothesized to be the simplest model that can be theoretically justify (Hair et al.,
2010). The CFI is one of the most often reported fit index due to being one of the measures least
affected by sample size (Bentler, 1990). The CFI ranges from zero to 1.00 with a value greater
than .90 indicating acceptable model fit (Byrne, 2009). Hair et al. (2010) provided cut-off values
ranges from greater than .90 to greater than .97, depending on situations (i.e., sample size and
number of variables). Following Kline (2011), this study uses χ² statistic to assess model fit
along with the SRMR, the RMSEA, and the CFI. The cut-off values are presented in Table 0.2.
The analysis of measurement model is reported in section 5.3.
Table 0.2: SEM Fit Indexes and the cut-off values used for this study
Overall Model Fit : Chi-Square (χ² ) Statistic
RMSEA
SRMR
CFI
Recommended value of good and acceptable fit

≤.08

≤.08

≥.9

Modification for model misspecification

>.08

>.08

<.9

Note: RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean
square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index.
Sources: Adopted from Kline (2011); Byrne (2009); Hu and Bentley (1999).

Stage 5 is a process of specifying the structural model. At this stage, the validated
measurement model is transformed into a structural model by assigning the relations from one
construct to another, which is the proposed research framework or theoretical model. The
structural model for this research is represented by the hypothesized paths, H1 to H12, as shown
in Table 0.2. Figure 9.2 presents the structural model produced by AMOS.
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The final stage is validating the structural model. The goal of this stage is to test the
proposed theoretical model. In doing so, two tests are emphasized; model fit and consistency of
the structural relations with theoretical expectations (Hair et al., 2010). Similar to the assessment
of measurement model validity, the test of model fit uses the fit measures, such as χ² statistic, the
SRMR, the RMSEA, and the CFI. The second test of structural model validity is to examine
individual path estimates. One has to assess whether each path coefficent is consistent with the
expectation (e.g., directionality, magnitude, etc). The analysis of structural model has been
reported in section 5.4.
Testing for mediating effects
A mediation effect is an indirect effect of a predictor variable on an outcome variable
through a mediating or intervening variable (MacKinnon et al., 2002). The indirect effect may be
calculated using methods such as the causal steps procedure, or by calculating the difference in
coefficients (MacKinnon et al., 2002). To formally test the mediation effect, the significance of
each hypothesized indirect relation must be tested. However, according to MacKinnon et al.
(2002), of 50 studies reviewed mediation, fewer than one third included any test of significance
of the mediating variable. Prior studies provide much information for various methods for
conducting significance tests for indirect effects, including Baron and Kenny (1986), Freedman
and Schatzkin (1992), Sobel (1982), and Mackinon and Lockwood (2001). Preacher and Hayes
(2008) suggested that the product-of-coefficients strategy is appropriate, as well as the
bootstrapping method. Hence, this study uses product-of-coefficients test by Sobel (1982), also
known as Sobel test (Sobel 1982, 1986) and the bootstrapping method (Shrout and Bolger,
1992), using the SPSS macro from Preacher and Hayes (2008).
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Chapter 5. Analysis and Results
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 4, the research methodology and the design were discussed. This chapter
provides information about the respondents’ profile along with the data screening process, as
well as the results of measurement and structural models. Most of the data in this study were
analyzed using AMOS version 18. Apart from AMOS 18, SPSS was used for some analysis.
The following sections describe the tests performed, divided into three subsections: Initial
data screening, assessment of measurement model, and assessment of structural model. Section
5.2 explains the following: respondents’ profile, analysis of missing data, test of multivariate
normality and outliers, and analysis of common method variance. In section 5.3, the
measurement model will be examined. The assessment of construct validity comprises
assessments of reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. In section 5.4, the
results of the path or structural model will be presented. The following analyses were performed:
model fit, parameter estimates and diagnostics, and mediation.

5.2 Data Screening
Methodological approaches, including tests of multivariate normality, identification of
missing data, identification of outliers, and analysis of common method variance (CMV) will be
discussed in this section. Initial data screening of 326 complete responses identified that some
respondents met the exclusion criteria questions. Those who selected that they have no IS
security policy in the organization or were completely unaware of the IS security policy
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requirements were excluded from the study. Additionally, respondents who did not provide
information regarding years of working in their current company were also excluded. It was
assumed that these respondents were not currently being employed. This resulted in a final sample
size of 290 responses with potentially useable data.

Demographic Information
As reported in Table 0.1, most of the respondents were male (69%). The data also
showed that the majority of the respondents have undergraduate or graduate degrees (combined
81.4%). This was expected given that the sample of respondents was obtained from graduate
students. Age differences were also apparent, with most of the respondents (50.7%) were
relatively young, between the ages of 26 and 35. Most of the respondents have been working
with their current company less than five years (70%). Almost 35% of them were at the
managerial level. In terms of the intensity of using computers at work, the respondents reported
an average of 7.7 hours per day. This may indicate that the jobs require the respondents to use
computers heavily, suggesting that their IS security behaviors may be important.
The results in Table 0.2 show that the industry types of the firms diverse widely. No
industry dominates the others. In terms of firm size (number of employees), one-third of the
firms has employees less than 500, which can be considered as small and medium sized (U.S
Small Business Association [SBA], 2012).
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Table 0.1: Respondents' Profile
Demographic Features

Frequency (n=290)

Percentage

Male

202

69.7

Female

86

29.7

Missing

2

0.7

College degree

45

15.5

Undergraduate degree

118

40.7

Graduate degree

Gender

Level of Education

118

40.7

Other

6

2.1

Missing

3

1

20 – 25

72

33.4

26 – 35

147

50.7

36 – 45

49

16.2

46 – 55

18

14.8

56 – 65

1

27.9

Missing

3

1.7

Less than 5 years

203

70

More than 5 years

87

30

Age

Years of working in current organization

Position in current organization
Owner of the Firm

8

2.8

Managing Director / Director

24

8.3

Chief Executive Officer

2

7

General Manager/Manager

47

16.2

Executive/Leader/ Officer

28

9.7

Non-management

155

53.4

Missing

26

9

Mean

SD

7.7

2.5

Hours of computer usage at work per day
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Table 0.2: Companies' Profile
Demographic Features

Frequency (n=290) Percentage

Firm size (by number of employees)
Fewer than 500

97

33.4

500 – 999

17

5.9

1,000 – 4,999

47

16.2

5,000 – 10,000

43

14.8

More than 10,000

81

27.9

Missing

5

1.7

Education

49

16.9

Financial Services

49

16.9

Government

24

8.3

Food/Beverage

5

1.7

Health Care

35

12.1

Manufacturing

17

5.9

Non-Profit

4

1.4

Medical, Bio-Technology, Pharmacology

6

2.1

Real Estate

2

0.7

Other Services

18

6.2

Information Technology

23

7.9

Telecommunications

5

1.7

Travel

0

0

Wholesale/Retail

13

4.5

Others

31

10.7

Missing

9

3.1

Industry

Examination of Missing Data
Non-ignorable missing data is data that cannot be classified as ignorable. It could be
known or unknown. Known missing data is due to procedural factors such as errors in data entry
and morbidity of the respondents. Researchers have little control over known non-ignorable
missing data (Hair et al., 2010). Unknown missing data are instances related directly to the
respondent. For example, a respondent may refuse to respond to certain questions due to the
sensitivity of the question or the respondent may not have sufficient knowledge or no opinion
about the question. In this situation, researchers should anticipate these problems and minimize
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them in the research design and data collection process. However, if this still happens,
researchers can apply certain types of remedies to mitigate the effect of missing data.
Hair et al. (2010) suggested four steps of missing data diagnosis: (1) determining the type
of missing data, (2) determining the extent of missing data, (3) diagnosing the randomness of
missing data, and (4) selecting a method to deal with missing data. In step 1, the type of missing
data, ignorable or non-ignorable was determined. The second step was conducted to assess the
extent and impact of the missing data. This was performed by tabulating the percentage and the
number of missing data for each variable and case.
Table 0.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the variables, including the percentage of
missing data on each variable. The lowest amount of missing data in these metric variables was 0
cases for CHOI1 (Item 1 for the construct choice), MEAN1 (Item 1 for the construct meaning),
MEAN2 (Item 2 for the construct meaning), PACT3 (Item 3 for the construct participation),
SETA2 (Item 2 for the construct SETA), SETA3 (Item 3 for the construct SETA), SETA4 (Item
4 for the construct SETA), ACC1 (Item 1 for the construct access), and ACC2 (Item 2 for the
construct access), and the highest was 1.7% (5 cases) for COMP2 (Item 2 for the construct
competence). This shows that all the variables have low levels of missing data.
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Table 0.3: Missing Data by Variables
Variable

N Mean Std. Deviation

Missing
Count Percent

Variable

N Mean Std. Deviation

Missing
Count Percent

ISPC1

289 6.24

1.128

1

0.3

SETA1

289 4.46

2.036

1

0.3

ISPC2

288 5.71

1.287

2

0.7

SETA2

290 3.36

2.081

0

0

ISPC3

288 5.48

1.412

2

0.7

SETA3

290 4.44

2.027

0

0

CHOI1

290 4.45

1.78

0

0

SETA4

290 4.75

1.97

0

0

CHOI2

288 4.24

1.761

2

0.7

SETA5

288 4.61

2.005

2

0.7

CHOI3

289 4.51

1.841

1

0.3

ACC1

290 4.49

1.832

0

0

MEAN1 290 5.09

1.759

0

0

ACC2

290 4.81

1.651

0

0

MEAN2 290 4.94

1.759

0

0

ACC3

289 5.03

1.582

1

0.3

MEAN3 286 4.98

1.694

4

1.4

PART1

289 3.99

1.983

1

0.3

COMP1 286 5.09

1.436

4

1.4

PART2

287 3.57

2.111

3

1

COMP2 285 5.08

1.347

5

1.7

COMP3 287 4.79

1.461

3

1

PACT1

289 4.69

1.791

1

0.3

PACT2

289 4.31

1.933

1

0.3

PACT3

290 4.44

1.968

0

0

Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived
meaning; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education,
training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation
in IS security decision-making.

Table 0.4 contains information regarding the amount of missing data per case. Based on
the complete case approach (listwise deletion), 272 cases were identified as being valid. It was
apparent that only one case has an excessive number of missing values (40%), making it likely to
be a candidate for deletion. Nevertheless, the extent of missing data for another 17 cases was low
(< 20%). Of these 17 cases, 13 cases were missing one data only. According to Little and Rubin
(1987), excluding cases with missing data reduces the sample size and valuable information.
This decrease can lead to reduced statistical power, overestimated variances, and wider
confidence intervals (Allison, 2003). Hence, apart from conventional listwise deletion, an
alternative missing data method was performed wherein only one case was deleted and the
remaining 17 cases were imputed (replaced).

94

Table 0.4: Missing Data by Cases
Number of Missing
Data per Case
0
1

Percentage of Missing
Number of Cases Percentage
Data per Case
0%
272
94
4%

13

4.5

2

8%

2

0.7

3

12%

1

0.3

4

16%

1

0.3

10

40%

1

0.3

290

100%

Total

A decision to choose the alternative missing data method depends on the randomness of
the missing data. Step 3 involves a procedure to determine whether the missing data are
distributed randomly across the cases and variables. If the missing data pattern is missing
completely at random (MCAR), all imputation methods for remedies are appropriate (Hair et al.,
2010). However, if the missing data is missing at random (MAR), researchers can use a modelbased approach to impute the missing data (Hair et al., 2010). The condition of MCAR was
examined using Little’s multivariate test (Little and Schenker, 1995). A MCAR missing data
pattern is indicated by a non-significant statistical level (p < .05), showing that the observed
pattern does not differ from the random pattern (i.e., null hypothesis). The results showed that
the little’s MCAR test had a significance level of .034, indicating a significant result. Thus, the
null hypothesis was rejected and the missing data was deemed to be MAR. Based on this result, a
model-based imputation method was selected as the alternative missing data method.
In step 4, the model-based imputation was performed based on the 289 cases. For this
study, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm method was used. The primary advantages
of the EM algorithm are simplicity and ease of computing (Little and Rubin, 1987). According to
Little and Rubin (1987), The EM algorithm formalizes a relatively old ad hoc idea for handling
missing data: (1) replace missing values by estimated values, (2) estimate parameters, (3) re95

estimate the missing values assuming the new parameter estimates are correct, (4) re-estimate
parameters, and so forth, iterating until convergence (p. 129). In other words, EM is an iterative
method to find the best possible value for the parameters (means, standard deviations, or
correlations), assuming the missing data were replaced. EM is readily available in the Missing
Value Analysis (MVA) module in SPSS.
Sensitivity analyses were performed to compare the results of the listwise deletion (272
cases) and EM methods (289 cases). CFAs showed that the model with 289 cases (χ2=484.45
(df=247, p <.05); RMSEA=.058; SRMR=.05; CFI=.94) fits the data slightly better than the
model with 272 cases (χ2=467.62 (df=247, p <.05); RMSEA=.065; SRMR=.07; CFI=.93). In no
instances did the imputation method change the overall model fit considerably. Consequently, it
was decided to leave all 289 observations in the analysis.
Examination of Univariate Normality and Outliers
A next data-screening step was completed, which involved assessing a multivariate
normality. Kline (2011) purported that multivariate normality is an assumption of Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE). As this study is using AMOS for data analysis, where the
structural model estimation was performed with MLE, the analysis is subject to the assumption
of multivariate normality. The normality problem exists when the multivariate distribution of the
observed variables has tails and/or peaks that differ from the normal distribution (Byrne, 2009).
There are statistical tests to detect multivariate normality, such as Mardia’s (1985) test, but there
are some weaknesses (Klein, 2011). Fortunately, multivariate non-normality can be detected
through inspection of univariate distributions (Klein, 2011).
Two tests are appropriate to determine the univariate normality, skewness and kurtosis.
Data distributions with either highly skewed or with high kurtosis is indicative of non-normality,
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which will have an effect on the estimation parameters and/or model specification (Hall and
Wang, 2004). Variables with values of skew index (SI) > ±3 are seen as extremely skewed
wherein the sign of the SI indicates the direction of the skew (Klein, 2011). Klein (2011) also
suggested that variables with values of the kurtosis index (KI) > ±10 suggest a problem. Table
0.5 provides the results of skewness and kurtosis. By the rules of thumb mentioned above, no
item exhibited significant skew or kurtosis.
Table 0.5: Assessment of Normality – Skew and Kurtosis
Variable

min

max

skew

kurtosis Variable

min

max

skew

kurtosis

ISPC1

1

7

-1.893

4.142

PACT1

1

7

-0.48

-0.804

ISPC2

1

7

-1.114

ISPC3

1

7

-1.127

1.046

PACT3

1

7

-0.34

-1.019

1.105

PART1

1

7

-0.06

-1.23

CHOI1

1

7

-0.328

-0.775

PART2

1

7

0.22

-1.333

CHOI2

1

7

-0.283

-0.899

ACC1

1

7

-0.52

-0.779

CHOI3

1

7

-0.356

-0.912

ACC2

1

7

-0.66

-0.238

MEAN1

1

7

-0.767

-0.394

ACC3

1

7

-0.66

-0.359

MEAN2

1

7

-0.708

-0.374

SETA1

1

7

-0.36

-1.13

MEAN3

1

7

-0.703

-0.387

SETA2

1

7

0.37

-1.183

COMP1

1

7

-0.728

0.23

SETA3

1

7

-0.35

-1.135

COMP2

1

7

-0.708

0.462

SETA4

1

7

-0.52

-0.92

COMP3

1

7

-0.608

-0.073

SETA5

1

7

-0.43

-1.084

Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived
meaning; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education,
training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation
in IS security decision-making.

The next step of data screening involved the identification of potential outliers.
Multivariate outliers refer to data that do not fit the standard sets of correlations exhibited by the
other data in the dataset. Although univariate outliers have an extreme score on single variable,
multivariate outliers have extreme scores on more than one variable (Kline, 2011). Specifically,
they are cases with extreme scores on two or more variables (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
Outliers can influence the analysis results by pulling the mean away from the median. To detect
multivariate outliers in AMOS, a Mahalanobis d-squared (D2) test can be performed. D2
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indicates the distance in standard deviation units between a set of scores (vectors) for an
individual case and the means for all variables (centroid) (Kline, 2011). According to Kline
(2011), a case with a very high D2 and a low p-value (p <.05) may lead to a rejection of the null
hypothesis that the case comes from the same population as the rest. This case is the most likely
candidate to be considered outlier.
Table 0.6: Observations farthest from the centroid (Mahalanobis distance)
Observation
number
189

Mahalanobis
d-squared
72.07

224

63.832

0

118

59.699

0

125

57.693

0

102

57.622

0

143

56.217

0

151

55.612

0

276

52.021

0.001

109

50.589

0.002

.

.

.

.

.

.

p1
0

.

.

.

213

38.703

0.039

219

38.604

0.04

24

38.433

0.042

8

37.871

0.048

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

261

28.475

0.286

71

28.44

0.288

273

28.133

0.302

289

28.034

0.306

Table 0.6 provides the excerpt of D2 for this study. The results showed that 43 cases have
D2 values with a p-value of less than .05, indicating that these cases could potentially be outliers.
Casewise diagnostics during each regression procedure were completed using the SPSS software
to identify whether the potential outliers are influential cases. Field (2009) suggested that
standardized residuals with an absolute value greater than 3 are cause for concern for influential
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case. Regression analyses were performed with and without these outliers to see the impact of
the outliers on regression coefficients. In no instances did the removal of potential outliers exert
undue influence over the parameters of the model. Consequently, it was decided to leave all
potential outliers in the analysis leaving 289 cases.
Examination of Common Method Variance (CMV)
The final step of data screening involved an examination of CMV. Since only self-report
data was collected, the possibility of CMV was present. Harman’s one-factor test was conducted
to assess whether CMV is present (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). In conducting the Harman’s
single-factor test, all variables of IS security policy compliance intentions, competence, meaning,
impact, choice, SETA, access, and participation related to IS security were entered into factor
analysis using principal axis factoring with varimax rotation. Results showed the presence of six
distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 (see Table 0.7). These six factors together
accounted for 70.3% of the total variance and the largest factor did not account for the majority
of the variance (i.e., 32.0%), indicating that CMV should not pose a pervasive issue (Podsakoff
et al., 2003).
Summary
This section described the respondents’ and companies’ profile, examined the
possibilities of missing data, multivariate normality, outliers, and common method variance. As
stated, an initial 290 usable cases were used to report the demographics. The data screening
process identified one case with extreme missing data (40%), which was removed from the
sample. The remaining missing data (<20% per case) were imputed using the EM model-based
imputation method. The remaining 289 cases were tested for univariate normality and outliers.
The results showed that the data was normally distributed. However, several cases were
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identified as potential outliers, but none was excluded leaving 289 usable cases for hypothesis
testing. 289 valid cases with seven IVs and 25 items indicate a very good case-to-variable ratio
(i.e., 12:1). This ratio satisfies the suggested ratio of 10:1 for CFA (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
Table 0.7: Harman's Factor Score

Initial Eigenvalues
Factor

Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
% of
Cumulative %
Variance
14.592
14.592

1

8.02

% of
Variance
32.08

2

3.477

13.907

45.987

2.87

11.48

26.072

3

1.912

7.647

53.634

2.762

11.047

37.119

4

1.694

6.775

60.409

2.165

8.66

45.779

5

1.314

5.255

65.664

2.045

8.181

53.961

6

1.158

4.63

70.294

1.916

7.664

61.624

7

0.939

3.756

74.05

8

0.766

3.064

77.114

9

0.658

2.632

79.747

10

0.546

2.185

81.931

11

0.515

2.06

83.991

12

0.485

1.94

85.931

13

0.463

1.853

87.784

14

0.406

1.626

89.41

15

0.365

1.46

90.869

16

0.316

1.264

92.134

17

0.301

1.204

93.338

18

0.262

1.049

94.386

19

0.262

1.048

95.434

20

0.232

0.928

96.362

21

0.207

0.828

97.19

22

0.189

0.757

97.948

23

0.183

0.734

98.681

24

0.171

0.683

99.365

25

0.159

0.635

100

Total

Cumulative %

Total

32.08

3.648

100

5.3 Measurement Model and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach, in which the measurement model was
assessed and improved prior to testing of the structural model, was used. This section describes
the assessments of measurement model. The assessment seeks to provide empirical support for
the hypothesized relationships. Hair et al. (2010) suggested two types of assessments, construct
validity or CFA, and overall model fit. The following section reports the results of these
assessments.
Construct validity
The aim of the construct validity analysis was to assess whether the measured variables
(indicator items) related to a specific latent construct are really measuring the latent construct as
theoretically predicted. To assess construct validity, Hair et al. (2010) suggested assessing the
model’s convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity was assessed by
factor loadings and average variance extracted (AVE). At a minimum, all the factor loadings
must be statistically significant (p < .05). A good rule of thumb is that the standardized loading
estimates and the AVE should be .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2010). Table 0.8 reports the
standardized loading estimates for the data. The lowest loading estimate obtained was .53,
linking the latent variable Choice to the variable CHOI2. More importantly, none of loadings
falls below the acceptable cut-off of .5, indicating that all items loaded significantly well to their
respective latent construct.
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Table 0.8: Factor loadings
SETA ACCESS PART IMPACT COMPETENCE MEANING CHOICE
SETA1

0.84

SETA2

0.62

SETA3

0.74

SETA4

0.91

SETA5

0.78

ACC1

0.74

ACC2

0.66

ACC3

0.74

PART1

0.81

PART2

0.79

PACT1

ISP COMPLIANCE
INTENTION

0.83

PACT2

0.9

PACT3

0.86

COMP1

0.89

COMP2

0.81

COMP3

0.87

MEAN1

0.88

MEAN2

0.87

MEAN3

0.89

CHOI1

0.87

CHOI2

0.53

CHOI3

0.84

ISPC1

0.61

ISPC2

0.85

ISPC3

0.69

Note. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived
meaningful; COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training
and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decisionmaking.

Table 0.9 reports the means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, AVEs, correlations,
and the square root of AVEs of the latent constructs. AVEs were estimated to provide
additional information for the convergent validity. An AVE of .5 or greater is considered
acceptable (Hair et al., 2010). The AVE for the latent constructs competence, meaning, impact,
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and choice, the dimensions of the psychological empowerment construct, were .73, .77, .74,
and .58, respectively.
Similarly, the latent constructs IS security policy compliance intentions, SETA, Access,
and Participation had AVE estimates of .52, .63, .51, and .64. The results confirm that the
items of a specific construct measure the same construct. Further, the Cronbach’s alpha values
for all of the constructs were greater than .75. A Cronbach’s alpha values of .7 or greater is
considered acceptable (Gefen et al. 2000; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The results indicate
that the responses are consistent across the items within a construct.
In addition, to confirm the discriminant validity of the constructs, the square root of the
AVEs for each construct were compared to the correlations of the constructs with their latent
variables (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). As reported in Table 0.9, the square root of the AVEs for
all constructs, reported in the diagonal of the correlation matrix, were larger than the
corresponding off-diagonal correlations. The off-diagonal scores are the correlations associated
with that constructs. These results indicate that the latent constructs of this study have
appropriate

discriminant

validity

(Fornell
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and

Larcker,

1981).

Table 0.9: Descriptive Statistics, Inter-correlations, and Internal Consistency
Mean

SD

α

CR

AVE

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. ISPC

3.378

0.623

0.752

0.762

0.521

0.722

2. SETA

4.416

1.502

0.881

0.870

0.631

0.502**

0.794

3. Acess

3.842

1.005

0.756

0.758

0.512

0.595**

0.573**

0.716

4. Participation

4.276

1.501

0.778

0.779

0.639

0.220**

0.286**

0.482**

0.799

5. Impact

3.693

1.412

0.895

0.895

0.740

0.069

0.028

0.239**

0.638**

0.860

6. Competence

4.930

1.224

0.889

0.891

0.732

0.541**

0.571**

0.514**

0.466**

0.182**

0.855

7. Meaning

5.093

1.480

0.910

0.910

0.772

0.557**

0.381**

0.621**

0.523**

0.281**

0.622**

0.878

8. Choice

4.207

1.432

0.781

0.798

0.579

0.211**

0.096*

0.154**

0.524**

0.366**

0.279**

0.271**

8

0.761

Note: N = 289. ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; Choice = Perceived choice; Meaning = Perceived meaningfulness; Competence = Perceived competence; Impact
= Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; Access = Access to IS security strategy and goals; Participation = Participation in IS security decisionmaking; Mean = Average; SD = Standard deviation; α = Cronbach’s Alpha, CR = Composite reliability, and AVE = Average Variance Extracted. Values below the diagonal are
correlation estimates among constructs and diagonal elements are square root AVE.
*p <.05, **p <.01 (2-tailed).
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Table 0.9 also reports the correlations among the latent constructs. Most of the
correlations are significant (p <.05), except the correlations between impact and IS security
policy compliance intentions, and between choice and SETA. Interestingly, there was a
significant positive correlation between SETA and participation in IS security decision-making
(r =.29, p <.01). There were also strong positive correlations between SETA and access to IS
security strategy and goals (r =.57, p <.01) as well as IS security strategy and goals, and
participation in IS security decision-making (r =.48, p <.01). These large magnitude correlations
are consistent with previous research that suggested that there should be strong relations between
empowerment work practices (Spreitzer, 1996). In addition, there were large magnitude
correlations between perceived meaning and competence (r =.62, p <.01) as well as perceived
choice and competence (r =.37, p <.01). There were moderate relations between meaning and
impact (r =.28, p <.01), competence and impact (r =.18, p <.05), choice and competence (r
=.28, p <.01), as well as choice and meaning (r =.27, p <.01). These large to moderate
magnitude correlations are consistent with previous research that suggested that there should be
“strong relations” between dimensions of psychological empowerment, such as perceived
meaning, competence, impact, and choice (Spreitzer, 1996).
Also of note, none of the significant correlations were too large (r > .80), indicating no
issues of multicollinearity (Field, 2009). Still, variance inflation factors (VIF) were computed to
assess the threat of multicollinearity. A VIF of more than 10.0 is an indication of a severe issue,
and less than 4.0 is an indication of no issue of multicollinearity (Bowerman and O’Connell,
1990). As none of the VIF in this study exceeded 4.0, it can be concluded that multicollinearity
was not a problematic issue. Together with the results of the assessment of reliability, as well as

105

convergent and discriminant validity, these results suggest the latent constructs and the overall
model have validity. Thus, all items were retained for further analysis.
Assessment of the measurement model fit
Table 0.10 presents the values of the fit indices for the measurement model of this study.
The overall measurement model fit was χ2=484.45 (df=247, p <.001), SRMR=.063, RMSEA
.058 with CI90: (.05, 0.065), and CFI=.94. The results reported that the values of SRMR and
RMSEA are less than the selected cut-off values of .08 (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Byrne, 2009;
Kline, 2011) corresponds to an “acceptable” fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002). Further, the value of
CFI is marginally lower than the cut-off of .95 (Hu and Bentley, 1999; Klein, 2011). However,
many researchers use a cut-off value of .90 as acceptable fit (McDonald and Ho, 2002). Thus,
overall, the results signify a reasonably good fit for the proposed measurement model.
Table 0.10: Fit Indices of the Proposed Measurement Model
Chi-Square (χ²) Statistic = 484.45 (df = 247, p < .001)
RMSEA
SRMR
CFI
.058
0.063
.943
CI90(.05, 0.065)
Note: RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = Standardized root mean
square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index; CI90 =90% Confidence interval. All results were
computed by AMOS.
Proposed Measurement Model

Model diagnostics, such as modification indices (MIs) were conducted to ensure that the
measurement model was well specified. MIs refers to any possible relation that is not estimated
in a model (Byrne, 2009). The purpose of MIs is to check for model fit. While the χ² statistic,
SRMR, RMSEA, and CFI provide global fit assessments, MIs focus on fit in various part of the
model separately, and, thus, local fit. A model could have a reasonable fit, but it may contain
severe misspecifications on one specific parameter. Overall fit assessments are based on specific
free parameters and constrained parameters. The free parameter means that the parameter is
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estimated, whereas constrained parameters are fixed at a certain value. For example, referring to
the factor loadings in Table 0.8, the variable ACC1 has a loading on the construct Access, but
not on the construct SETA. This indicates that the loading of the variable ACC1 on the construct
SETA is fixed to 0 whereas the loading between the variable ACC1 and the construct Access is
estimated. AMOS calculates a MIs for the possible loading of the variable ACC1 to other
constructs (e.g., SETA). MIs indicate how much the χ² value of a model would drop if the
parameter is freed instead of constrained. In other words, MIs indicate by how much the model
fit could improve if a variable (i.e., ACC1) is allowed to load to another construct (i.e., SETA). If
an MI shows a value higher than 20, it indicates that the respective fixed parameter is ‘wrong’
and should be considered a serious misfit (Byrne, 2009). MIs for the factor loadings (see Table
0.11) were all below 20, indicating no serious impact on model fit (Byrne, 2009). Thus, no
modification was made.
Table 0.11: Modification Indices
Loading

M.I

Loading

M.I

PACT1

<--- MEANING

11.99

COMP2

<--- CHOICE

4.907

PACT1

<--- COMPETENCE

6.411

PACT3

<--- MEANING

4.115

PACT1

<--- ACCESS

7.203

PACT3

<--- ISP COMPLIANCE

6.385

PACT1

<--- SETA

4.074

ACC1

<--- SETA

7.987

PACT1

<--- ISP COMPLIANCE

15.95

ACC1

<--- SETA2

5.16

ISPC3

<--- COMPETENCE

4.288

ACC2

<--- SETA

4.343

CHOI1

<--- ACCESS

5.956

ACC3

<--- CHOICE

4.384

CHOI1

<--- ISP COMPLIANCE

8.158

SETA2

<--- CHOICE

17.25

CHOI2

<--- COMPETENCE

5.988

SETA2

<--- PART

18.04

CHOI3

<--- MEANING

4.151

SETA2

<--- ISP COMPLIANCE

5.15

CHOI3

<--- COMPETENCE

9.962

SETA2

<--- PART2

4.208

PACT1

<--- MEANING

6.303

SETA3

<--- MEANING

5.209

PACT1

<--- COMPETENCE

6.079

SETA4

<--- PART

6.231

8.228
<--- CHOICE
4.606
CHOI3 <--- ISP COMPLIANCE
SETA5
Note. ISPC = ISP compliance intentions; CHOI = Perceived choice; MEAN = Perceived meaningful;
COMP = Perceived competence; PACT = Perceived impact; SETA = IS security education, training and
awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decisionmaking.
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Overall results of the measurement model
In summary, the fit assessments generally supported the proposed measurement model. In
the measurement validation process, the model showed convergent validity and discriminant
validity. The measured items had significant loadings with their respective latent constructs. The
AVEs for all the constructs were higher than the minimum threshold of .5 (Hair et al., 2010). The
square root of the AVEs for each construct were higher than the correlations of the constructs
with their latent variables. Further, the fit indices indicated that the measurement model achieved
a fairly satisfactory level of fit (χ2=484.45 (df=247, p <.001), SRMR=.063, RMSEA .058, and
CFI=.94). Both the RMSEA and SRMR were below the recommended cut-off values of .08, and
the CFI was slightly below the cut-off value of .95. Furthermore, the MIs showed no issue of
misfit. Thus, it can be concluded that the proposed measurement model was well specified.

5.4 Assessment of Structural Model
After assessing the measurement model, the second step of Anderson and Gerbing’s twostep approach is to evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed structural model (Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988). A structural model is a composite of a measurement model and a path model
(Mcdonald and Ho, 1992).
Structural Model Fit
Structural model validity is assessed by comparing the estimated covariance matrix with
the observed covariance matrix. A structural model cannot fit any better (e.g., lower χ2) than the
measurement model because the structural model cannot have more relations between constructs
than the measurement model (Hair et al., 2010). The measurement model assumes that a relation
exists between each pair of constructs whereas the structural model relations are simpler. That
means, the measurement model is a “larger” model with more freely estimated parameters, and
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the structural model is a “smaller” model with fewer parameters freely estimated, and that the
structural model is nested in the measurement model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). Therefore,
measurement model fit provides a baseline to assess structural model fit. The fit indices of the
proposed structural model are presented in Table 0.12.
Table 0.12: Proposed Structural Model Fit Indices
Overall Model Fit
Fit Measures
Proposed Structural Model Fit

RMSEA

SRMR

CFI

.068

.09

.92

CI90 (.61, .075)
χ² (df) of the Proposed Structural Model

608.55 (263) ( p < .001)
484 (247) ( p < .001)

χ² (df) of the Measurement Model

Note: df = degree of freedom; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation; SRMR =
Standardized root mean square residual; CFI = Comparative fit index; CI90 =90% Confidence interval.
All results were computed with AMOS.

The structural model fit was χ2=608.55 (df =263, p <.001), SRMR=.09, RMSEA=.068
with CI90: (.061, .075), and CFI = .92. The RMSEA was lower than the cut-off value of .08, the
SRMR was slightly above the cut-off value of .08, and the CFI was lower than the cut-off value
of .95, but still acceptable at the cut-off value of .90. The fit indices indicated that the structural
model achieved a fairly satisfactory level of fit. The proposed structural model is shown in
Figure 5.1 with the estimated regression coefficients of the paths (β) and their p-value.
Also of important note, the structural model was a composite of a measurement model
and path model (Mcdonald and Ho, 1992). Therefore, it might be useful to decompose the
measure of fit into measurement and path models (Mcdonald and Ho, 1992; Williams and
O’Boyle, 2010; O’Boyle and Williams, 2011). Mcdonald and Ho (1992) purported that if a
composite model has an unacceptable fit, it is important to know if the misfit is contributed by
the measurement model, path model or both. Thus, global fit indices produced by a composite
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model may yield misleading conclusions about the adequacy of a path model (Williams and
O’Boyle, 2010). Mcdonald and Ho (1992) revised the formula for the RMSEA that focuses on
path model. O’Boyle and Williams (2010) have referred to this RMSEA as RMSEA-P. The
RMSEA-P for the proposed structural was .15, slightly higher than the cut-off of .10 (Brown and
Cudeck, 1993). The results indicate that the path model had a poor fit.

Figure 0.1: Results of the Proposed Structural Model

Structural
Empowerment

SETA

Access

Intrinsic Motivation in
IS Security

.59**

.52**

Information Security
Performance

Competence
(R=35%)

.35**

Meaning

.42**

(R=47%)
.27**

Participation

.64**

Impact

-.13†

ISPC
Intention
(R=37%)

(R=44%)
.07

.52**

Choice
(R=27%)

Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); ISPC = ISP compliance intentions; SETA = IS security
education, training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS
security decision-making. The full SEM model is shown in Appendix-Figure 9.3.

Hypothesis Testing
Good fit alone is not sufficient to support the validity of the structural model (Hair et al.,
2010). Assessment of the validity of the structural model must include an examination of the
individual structural parameter estimates against the corresponding hypotheses. A researcher
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needs to investigate the extent to which the parameter estimates are statistically significant and in
the predicted direction (Hair et al., 2010). In addition, variance-explained estimate, or R2 for the
relations between the predictor variables and the outcome variable should also be reported.
The validity of the structural model were assessed based on the standardized estimated
path coefficient (β) along with the critical ratio (CR) and the p-value, as shown in Table 5.13.
The standard decision rules (CR ≥ 1.96 and p ≤ .05) were applied to determine the significance
of all path coefficients (Byrne, 2009). In addition, Figure 5.1 displays the path model with the
standardized estimated path coefficients (β), the significance levels, and the explanatory power
or variance explained (R2).
The effect of the dimensions of psychological empowerment on IS security policy compliance
intentions (Hypothesis 1 – 4)
Hypothesis 1 stated that perceived competence of IS security tasks positively relate to IS
security policy compliance intentions. Table 0.13 shows that perceived competence was
positively related to IS security policy compliance intentions (β=.35, p <.01). The finding
supports Hypothesis 1. This result suggests that a high degree of competence of IS security tasks
tends to increase one’s intentions to comply with organizational IS security policy.
Hypothesis 2 stated that perceived meaningfulness of IS security positively relates to IS
security policy compliance intentions Table 0.13 shows that the path coefficient was significant
(β=.42, p <.01), providing a support for this hypothesis. This indicates that the higher the degree
of perceived meaningfulness of the IS security tasks, the greater the intention to comply with the
required tasks. In other words, if one perceives that IS security tasks are meaningful and
important, it motivates him/her to comply with organizational IS security policy. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 was supported.
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Table 0.13: Hypothesized Path Relations for Proposed Structural Model
Proposed Structural Model
Hypothesis

Standardized
S.E C.R. (t)
Parameter Estimate

H1 Perceived competence of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to
comply with the IS security policies.
H2 Perceived meaningfulness of IS security task positively affects one’s intention
to comply with the IS security policies.
H3 Perceived impact of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to
comply with the IS security policies.
H4 Perceived choice of IS security task positively affects one’s intention to
comply with the IS security policies.
H5 SETA programs are positively associated with one’s perceived competence of
IS security task.
H6 Access to the organizational IS security strategy and goals is positively
associated with one’s perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H7 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H8 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s
perceived impact of IS security task.
H9 Participation in IS security decision making is positively associated with one’s
perceived freedom of IS security task.

Results*

0.35

0.04

8.97

.000

Supported

0.42

0.04

12.00 .000

Supported

-0.13

0.03

-4.19

.051 Not supported

0.07

0.03

2.41

.332 Not supported

0.59

0.06

9.37

.000

Supported

0.52

0.1

5.25

.000

Supported

0.27

0.12

2.31

.000

Supported

0.64

0.07

9.85

.003

Supported

0.52

0.06

8.13

.000

Supported

Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); S.E = Standard Error; CR = Critical Ratio
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p

Hypothesis 3 suggested that perceived impact of IS security positively relates to IS
security policy compliance intentions. Table 0.13 shows that perceived impact was negatively
related to IS security policy compliance intentions at a marginal level of significance (β=-.13, p
<.1). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4 stated that perceived choice in IS security positively relate to IS security
policy compliance intentions. Unlike competence and meaning, the result in Table 0.13 showed
that perceived choice did not predict IS security policy compliance intentions (β=.07, p >.1). As
a result, there was no evidence that choice or self-determination predicted IS security policy
compliance intentions. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
The R2 for intentions to comply with IS security policy is .37, indicating that 37% of the
variance of the intentions to comply can be explained by these four dimensions of psychological
empowerment. This suggests that feelings of empowerment do have a significant influence on IS
security policy compliance intentions.
The effect of elements of structural empowerment (Hypothesis 5 – 9)
Hypothesis 5 stated that SETA positively relates to psychological empowerment,
specifically perceived competence. Table 0.13 shows that SETA was positively related to
perceived competence (β=.59, p <.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was supported. The R2 for
perceptions of competence was .35, indicating that the variance of competence explained by
SETA is 35%.
Hypothesis 6 stated that access to IS security strategy and goals positively relates to
perceived meaning. The result (see Table 0.13) shows that access to IS security strategy and
goals predicted meaning (β=.52, p <.01). Further, Hypothesis 7 stated that participation IS
security decision-making is associated with perceptions of meaning. The results indicate that
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participation in IS security decision-making is related to perceptions of meaning (β=.27, p <.01).
Therefore, Hypotheses 6 and 7 were supported. Both access to IS security strategy and goals, and
participation in IS security decision-making explained 47% the variance of meaning.
Hypothesis 8 and 9 stated that participation in IS security decision-making predicts
impact and choice, respectively. The results (see Table 0.13) show that participation in IS
security decision-making predicts perceptions of impact (β=.64, p <.01) and perceptions of
choice (β=.52, p <.01). Both Hypotheses 8 and 9 were supported. The R2 for perceptions of
impact and choice are .44 and .27 respectively.
In sum, two of four dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e., perceived
competence and meaning) did predict IS security policy compliance intentions. However,
contrary to the predictions, perceived impact negatively related to IS security policy compliance
intentions and perceived choice did not predict employee’s intentions to comply with IS security
policy. Additionally, all structural empowerment facets related to the dimensions of
psychological empowerment, as hypothesized. SETA positively related to perceived competence,
access to IS security strategy and goals was related to perceived meaning and impact, and
participation in IS security decision-making predicted perceived meaning, impact, and choice.
Results for the mediating effects (Hypothesis 10 – 12)
Table 0.14 displays the five hypotheses for mediating effects. Hypothesis 10 predicted
that SETA was related to IS security policy compliance intentions via competence. The indirect
effect (βIND) was .1285 (SE=.0222). Using the Sobel test, the indirect effect of SETA was
statistically significant (z=5.788, SE=.0222, p <.01). Also, the bootstrap analysis supported the
conclusion of mediation (the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect
excluded zero ([.0901, .1764]) (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Thus, perceptions of competence did
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mediate the relations between SETA and IS security policy compliance intentions, providing
support for Hypothesis 10.
Hypothesis 11 stated the effect from access to IS security strategy and goals to IS security
policy compliance intentions will be mediated by perceptions of meaning. Notably, the indirect
effect (βIND) was .1865 (SE=.0344). The results of the Sobel test (z=5.422, SE=.0344, p <.01),
and the bootstrap analysis (the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect
excluded zero ([.1217, .2567])) support a conclusion of mediation. As a result, the findings
indicated that the perceptions of meaning mediated the relations between access to IS security
strategy and goals, and IS security policy compliance intentions. Hypothesis 11 was thus
supported.
Hypothesis 12a through 12c proposed that three dimensions of psychological
empowerment (i.e., perceptions of meaning, impact, and choice) act as mediators of the relations
between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance
intentions. As shown in Table 0.14, the indirect effect (βIND) through meaning was .1684
(SE=.0204). The Sobel test suggested that the indirect effect is statistically significant (z=8.255,
SE=.0204, p <.01). The bootstrap analysis supported the conclusion of mediation as well. The
results show that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the total indirect effect excluded
zero ([.1324, .2122]). Thus, the results suggest that perceptions of meaning mediated the
relations between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance
intentions. Thus, Hypothesis 12a was supported.
The indirect effect (βIND) from participation in IS security decision-making process to the
perceived impact to IS security policy compliance intentions was -.0879 (SE=.078). The results
of the Sobel test (z=-1.127, SE=.078, p >.1) and the bootstrap analysis (the 95% bias-corrected
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confidence interval for the total indirect effect included zero ([-.142, .043])) fail to support
hypothesis 12b. Thus, perceived impact did not mediate the relation between participation in IS
security decision-making and IS security policy compliance intentions.
Hypothesis 12c was not supported too. Notably, the indirect effect (βIND) was .0128 (SE =
.0189). The Sobel test indicated that the indirect effect of participation in IS security decisionmaking via choice was not statistically significant (z=.0677, SE=.0189, p >.05). The bootstrap
analysis did not supported a conclusion of mediation as well (the 95% bias-corrected confidence
interval for the total indirect effect included zero ([-.023, .0621]). This results suggest that
perceptions of choice do not mediated the relations between participation in IS security decisionmaking and IS security policy compliance intention.
In sum, perceived competence served as mediating variable between SETA and IS security
policy compliance intentions. As hypothesized, perceptions of meaning was an important mediator of
the relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security policy compliance
intentions (i.e., Hypothesis 11), and participation in IS security decision-making and IS security
policy compliance intentions (i.e., Hypothesis 12a). However, perceived impact and choice do not
mediate the relations between participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy
compliance intentions. Overall, there was empirical support for Hypotheses 10, 11, and 12a, but not
for 12b and 12c.
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Table 0.14: Mediation of the SETA, Access and Participation of Employees on Intentions to Comply with IS security policy through Employees'
Perception of Competence, Meaning, Impact, and Choice

.
Bootstrapping
Product of Coefficent

BC 95% CI

Hypothesis

Specific Indirect Effect

Point Estimate
(βIND)

SE

Z

p

Lower

Upper

H10 The effect of SETA on one’s intention to comply with IS security
policies is mediated by perceived competence of IS security task.

SETA --> Competence --> ISPC

0.1285

0.0222

5.788

.000

0.09

0.1764

ACCESS --> Meaning --> ISPC

0.1865

0.0344

5.422

.000

0.122

0.2567

PART --> Meaning --> ISPC

0.1684

0.0204

8.255

.000

0.132

0.2122

PART --> Impact --> ISPC

-0.0879

0.078

-1.127

.130

-0.1421 0.0431

PART --> Choice --> ISPC

0.0128

0.0189

0.677

.499

-0.0229 0.0521

H11 The effect of access to IS security strategy and goals on one’s
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H12a The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by
perceived meaningfulness of IS security task.
H12b The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by
perceived impact of IS security task.
H12c The effect of participation in IS security decision making on one’s
intention to comply with IS security policies is mediated by
perceived choice of IS security task.

Note: = ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; ACC = Access to IS security strategy and goals;
PART = Participation in IS security decision-making; BC = bias corrected; 5,000 bootstrap samples.
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5.5 Supplementary Analyse
Analyses

Testing for types
ypes of mediating effect
The reported results showed that feelings of meaning and competence can act as mediators
in the relationss between structural empowermen
empowermentt facets and IS security policy compliance
intentions. Although no prediction was made as to whe
whether
ther the mediation role of perceptions of
meaning and competence in the model are partial or full mediation
mediation,, further analysis we made
using the method suggested by Kenny and Baron (1986). Following Baron and Kenny, ‘path c’ is
the coefficient for each independent
pendent variable (i.e., SETA, Access, and Participation) to the
dependent variable (i.e., IS security policy compliance) without the mediator (see Figure 5.2 [a]).
‘Path c’’ is the coefficient of the link between independent variable and dependent variable when
the mediator
tor is in the model (see Figure 5.2[b]). If ‘path c’’ is significant
gnificant and smaller than ‘path
c’, this suggests partial mediation. If ‘path c’’ becomes statistically insignificant and close to
zero, it suggests a full mediation.
Figure 0.2: Mediating Effect
(a)

(b)
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The results of mediation are presented in Table 0.15. The results indicate that competence
partially mediated the effects of SETA on intentions to comply with IS security policy.
Perceptions of meaning fully mediated the effects of participation in IS security decision-making
on intentions to comply with IS security policy, and it partially mediated the effects of access to
IS security goals on intentions to comply with IS security policy.
Table 0.15: Results of mediating analysis

Mediator: Meaning

Mediator: Competence

IV: Access

IV: Participation

IV: SETA

Path c

.3777**

.1424**

.2198**

Path c'

.1900**

-.0259

.0913**

Partial Mediation

Full Mediation

Partial Mediation

Note: † p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); IV = Independent variable

Testing for potential moderating effect
In addition, although not directly hypothesized, an assessment of the moderating effects
of access to IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making on
perceived meaning, was considered important. Moderation is the effect of a third variable that
changes the magnitude or direction of the relations between two other variables (MacKinnon et
al., 2012). An interaction term was calculated using mean-centered variables of access to IS
security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making. As shown in Table
0.16 perceived meaning was not predicted by the access-participation interaction (β =-0.032, p
>.05). Hence, the possibility of interaction effects was not supported.
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Table 0.16: Interacting participation and access on perceptions of meaning
Regression

Standardized
Parameter Estimate
0.258

S.E.

C.R.

P

0.047

5.498

**

Meaning

<--- PART

Meaning

<--- ACCESS

0.577

0.048

12.103

**

Meaning

<--- Access_X_Part

-0.032

0.039

-0.825

0.409

ISPC

<--- Meaning

0.64

0.045

14.142

**

Note: = ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; ACCESS = Access to IS security strategy
and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-making.
† p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests); S.E = Standard Error; CR = Critical Ratio

Testing for second-order construct of psychological empowerment
Finally, to further investigate the notion that empowerment has an overall positive effect
on IS security performance, a post hoc test was conducted by introducing psychological
empowerment as a second-order construct. The second-order construct of empowerment was
treated as a reflective construct with the measures of the latent variable scores of its four
dimensions (i.e., competence, meaning, impact, and choice). Figure 5.3 summarizes the
empirical model as analyzed with AMOS 18. The R2 for IS security policy compliance was .44
and the R2 for psychological empowerment was .77. In addition, all the paths were significant at
the level of p <.001. This indicates that psychological empowerment as a single, global construct
has a positive effect on IS security behavior, and is strongly predicted by structural
empowerment facets.
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Figure 0.3: Structural model with empowerment as a second-order construct

Structural
Empowerment

Intrinsic Motivation in
Information Security

Competence

Information Security
Performance

Meaning

SETA
.79**

.78**
0.23**

Psychological
Empowerment
(R2 = .71)

Access
.41**
.35**

Participation

.66**

ISPC
(R2 = .44)

.40**

.40**

Choice

Impact

Note: ISPC = IS security policy compliance intentions; SETA = IS security education, training and awareness; ACC
= Access to IS security strategy and goals; PART = Participation in IS security decision-making. R2 = variance
explained.
† p <0.1; * p <.05; ** p <0.01 (two-tailed tests);

5.6 Summary
This chapter reported the analysis and the results of the proposed research model. The
chapter started with a description of the data screening processes where 289 cases were identified
valid. The 289 valid cases with seven IVs and 25 items indicate a very good case-to-variable
ratio (i.e., 12:1). This ratio satisfies the suggested ratio of 10:1 for CFA (Fornell and Larcker,
1981). The CFA indicated that the proposed measurement model was well specified. Following
the CFA, the assessment of the validity of the structural model was performed. It was discovered
that the proposed structural model was marginally fit. Four of the 14 hypotheses were not
supported. Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12a were supported, and Hypotheses 3, 4,
12b, and 12c were not supported. The next chapter provides a discussion of the results.
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Chapter 6. Discussion
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overall synthesis of the research findings and a
discussion of implications. A discussion of the implication focuses on the contribution of the
research to the IS security field; that is, whether the results confirm previous work or not. This
demonstrates the entire research agenda reflected in the dissertation.
This chapter is organized into three sections. After the introduction, the three research
questions discussed in Chapter 1 are re-examined. The third section examines the main findings
of the research and discusses whether they confirm previous studies or break new ground, and
discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the study.

6.2 Reexamination of the research questions
Studies of the relations between extrinsic or controlled motivation of individuals and their
IS security behaviors have a long and rich tradition. Earlier work in this vein has shown that
sanctions, rewards, and social pressures, predict IS security policy compliance (Straub, 1990;
Chan et al., 2005; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Boss et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009a). However,
other studies reported that intrinsic factors could also motivate IS security behavior (Herath and
Rao, 2009a, 2009b; Son, 2011). In his study, Son (2011) found that intrinsic motivation—
perceptions of legitimacy and value congruence—are more likely than any set of extrinsic
motivational factors to encourage compliance with IS security policy. However, the IS security
literature has paid far less attention to intrinsic motivational factors when compared to extrinsic
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motivational factors. Consequently, calls were made to study the effect of intrinsic motivational
factors on IS security policy compliance (Padayachee, 2012; Herath and Rao, 2009a).
Responding to the call, and drawing upon Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic
motivation model, this dissertation used psychological empowerment as the intrinsic
motivational factor. The model purported that psychological empowerment is a manifestation of
four cognitions derived from a specific task—competence, meaning, impact, and choice. That is,
employees are likely to feel empowered if they perceive that they have the capability to perform
the task activities skillfully and successfully, perceive that the value of the task is consistent with
their personal beliefs, perceive that they can make a significant difference or contribute to the
organization if they execute the task, and finally, perceive that they feel in control to select tasks
and perform in ways that seem appropriate.
Theory and prior studies have both argued that feelings of empowerment exert influence
on individuals to put more effort towards the execution and performance of a task (Oldham and
Hackman, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Spreitzer et al., 1997;
Kraimer et al., 1999; Liden et al., 2000). Although empirical studies found that these four
dimensions are capturing the essence of psychological empowerment construct (Spreitzer,
1995a; Kraimer et al., 1999), researchers argued that it is also crucial to disentangle which
psychological empowerment dimension actually associates with outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997;
Kraimer et al., 1999; Maynard et al., 2012). In fact, studies have found that each dimension
contributes to different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999). Hence, this study
responded to the gaps in the IS security literature by investigating the influences of each
dimension of psychological empowerment on IS security compliance intentions.
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The argument presented in the first chapter states that employees’ intrinsic motivation
may be driven by factors external to the employees (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990; Ryan and
Deci, 2000). Prior studies in IS security compliance have suggested various external factors and
strategies, such as providing training, improving the task design, enhancing the IS security
climate, and so on, to drive employees’ intrinsic motivation (Herath and Rao, 2009b; Bulgurcu et
al., 2010; Son, 2011). However, rather than exploring the range of external factors empirically,
most studies have simply acknowledged their importance. Thus, this current study was motivated
to fill the gap. One way an organization can stimulate the feelings of empowerment among its
employees is providing empowering work structures. This include the enhancement of their
knowledge and skills through training and education related to the task, providing them access to
information about the strategy and goal of the task, and involve them in decision-making
processes related to their tasks (Spreitzer, 1995a; Wallach and Meuller, 2006; Hon and Rensvold,
2006; Lanschinger et al., 2004). Although most studies have ‘bundled’ these practices, Maynard
et al. (2012) argued that it is difficult to determine which structural empowerment facets are
actually related to the four dimensions of psychological empowerment. Therefore, this study has
attempted to uncover the relations among the structural empowerment facets and the dimensions
of psychological empowerment in the context of IS security.
The idea of psychological empowerment serving as mediator between structural
empowerment and individual performance-related outcomes has been supported in numerous
studies (Spreitzer, 2007; Maynard et al., 2012). Nielsen (1986) claimed that changing the
organizational structural context is not enough to change individual behavior; ultimately, an
individual feeling of empowerment is necessary to influence such behaviors (cf. Spreitzer,
1995b). Consistent with this line of argument, this study has replicated previous studies to
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investigate the mediating role of psychological empowerment on the relations between elements
of structural empowerment, and IS security policy compliance intentions.
In sum, the review presented above led to three specific research questions: What is the
impact of the four dimensions of employees’ psychological empowerment, on IS security policy
compliance intentions? How do elements of structural empowerment, including SETA, access to
information regarding IS security strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decisionmaking, enhance the dimensions of psychological empowerment with respect to IS security? Do
the four dimensions of psychological empowerment mediate the relations between elements of
structural empowerment and IS security policy compliance intentions? The following
subsections discuss the findings and the implications.
Research Question 1
This study argued that employees’ intrinsic motivation affects their IS security policy
compliance intentions. Specifically, this study examined how employees’ perceptions of
empowerment (i.e., their perceptions of competence, meaning, impact, and choice) affect their
intentions to display IS security compliance behavior. As Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990)
intrinsic motivation theory indicates, individuals who feel that their work or task is empowering,
they are more motivated to expend more energy and work hard on the task (Thomas and
Velthouse, 1990).
The findings of this study are mixed. In general, the results suggest that the feeling of
empowerment, dominated by the perceptions of competence and meaning dimensions, has
positive effects on IS security policy compliance intentions, as predicted in Hypothesis 1 and 2.
However, Hypothesis 3 and 4, which predict that feelings of impact and choice relate to IS
security compliance, were not supported. These results are agreed with findings by Liden et al.
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(2000), who found that meaning and competence are strong predictors of work satisfaction,
behavioral intentions, and job performance.
The results indicate that feelings of competence influence individuals’ intentions to
comply with the IS security policy. The significant effect of competence implies that employees
who saw themselves as having the skills and capability to manage the IS security tasks have the
intention to perform those tasks. Previous studies have found evidence that employees’ belief in
their competence in IS security influences their decision to perform (or not perform) IS security
related activities, particularly those prescribed by the organizational IS security policies (Chan et
al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Herath & Rao, 2009; Rhee et al., 2009). In fact, a meta-analysis
by Stajkovic and Luthans (1996) concluded that the perceived competence influences task
performance in various contexts.
Furthermore, the results suggest that feelings of meaning are related to IS security policy
compliance intentions. The significant effect of meaning indicates that employees who felt that
the IS security tasks are meaningful are motivated to put more effort to accomplish the goals of
the IS security tasks. As Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) theory indicates, individuals are more
likely to engage, do well, and put more energy into a task if the task activities are meaningful,
serve an important purpose, and are in accordance with their own values and goals. This result is
also consistent with previous studies showing that meaning is associated with numerous workrelated benefits, such as courtesy behavior, work performance, higher commitment to work, and
engagement at work (e.g., Liden et al., 2000; Wat and Shaffer, 2004; Wang and Lee, 2009; May
et al., 2004). The result supports extant literature but not in IS security literature because
perceptions of meaning derived from IS security tasks have never been studied in IS security
research. Thus, this study contributes to the IS literature by concluding that employees tend to
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intrinsically motivated to perform the IS security tasks and achieve IS security goals if they
perceive that the IS security tasks are meaningful.
Contrary to expectations, perceptions of impact had a marginal significant negative
relations with IS security policy compliance intentions. This indicates that the stronger
individuals’ feelings of impact of the IS security tasks, the lower their intentions to comply with
IS security policy. This result is contrary to prior findings that found that impact is positively
related to IS security behavior and other individual performance-related outcomes (Herath and
Rao, 2009b; Seibert et al., 2011; Maynard et al., 2012). For instance, Herath and Rao (2009b)
found that employees are found to adopt a favorable IS security compliance behaviors when they
perceived that their IS security actions can benefit the organization. However, in the current
study, the effect was only marginally significant.
In addition, the results of this study do not support the hypothesized relations between
perceived choice or self-determination and IS security policy compliance intentions. This
indicates that whether or not the employees feel that they can operate the IS security tasks
autonomously, may not matter. Spreitzer et al. (1997) also reported this somewhat surprising
result. Spreitzer et al. (1997) found that self-determination was only marginally related to the
affective outcomes of work satisfaction but not to performance-related outcomes. Further, Liden
et al. (2000) found that self-determination did not relate to either affective or performance
outcomes.
Finally, as the post-hoc analysis results have indicated, psychological empowerment has
an overall positive impact on employees’ IS security policy compliance intentions. This provides
support for the intrinsic motivation model (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990) and the contentions of
intrinsic motivation studies in various domains (e.g., Spreitzer, 1995a; Laschinger et al., 2004;
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Aryee and Chen, 2006). However, when the dimensions of psychological empowerment were
detangled and tested individually, only two of the dimensions (i.e., perceptions of competence
and meaning) predicted IS security policy compliance intentions. Although another two
dimensions (i.e., perceptions of impact and choice) are not positively related to IS security policy
compliance intentions, the results were not surprising because different dimensions of
psychological empowerment may influence different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997). The
results of this study are also aligned with Kraimer et al.’s (1999) claim that perceived impact and
choice may relate to affective outcomes, rather than behavioral intentions.
Research Question 2
This study argued that structural empowerment practices are associated with employees’
psychological empowerment. More specifically, structural empowerment allows employees to
obtain power in terms of opportunity for training, participation in decision-making, and access to
information, which hence may influence the feelings that they are empowered (Spreitzer, 1996;
Spreitzer, 2008; Seibert et al., 2011). The position of intrinsic motivation theorists is that
although intrinsic motivation is an innate part of individuals and derived from a specific task, it
must be prompted and enhanced by external factors (Oldham and Hackman, 1980; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). Therefore, external factors such as structural
empowerment work practices is vital in enhancing employees’ intrinsic motivation.
The results of this study also support for the relations between structural empowerment
work practices and psychological empowerment, which is aligned with prior studies in various
contexts (Spreitzer, 1996; Siu et al., 2005; Wallach and Mueller, 2006; Bordin et al., 2006). In
other words, the obtained results suggest that different structural empowerment facets relate to
different dimensions of psychological empowerment, consistent with prior studies (Spreitzer et
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al., 1997; Liden et al., 2000). Specifically, this study found that IS security training, education,
and awareness (SETA) are significantly related to the competence dimension of psychological
empowerment (Hypothesis 5). This indicates that employees develop their competence or selfefficacy through the ongoing acquisition of knowledge regarding the IS security controls. As
self-efficacy arguments indicate, self-efficacy beliefs are developed through an effective mastery
experiences (Bandura, 1977). This is consistent with previous studies showing that perceived
opportunity for training predicts perceptions of competence (Gist et al., 1989; Agarwal et al.,
2000; Liao et al., 2009).
Next, access to information security strategy and goals are significantly related to
meaning (Hypothesis 6). A meta-analytic by Seibert et al. (2011) concluded that information
about strategy or operational goals allows employees to see the work as personally meaningful
because they understand how their work fits into the goals and strategies. This indicates that
access to information regarding IS security strategy and goals would allow employees to feel
informed about where an organization is headed. Hence, they should know how their own IS
security tasks contribute to achieving the IS security goals. That is, they acquire a greater sense
that the IS security task is meaningful to be executed because they know that their IS security
task is supporting the IS security objectives and benefit the organization at the end. This finding
is apparently consistent with past findings reported by Spreitzer (1996) and Bordin et al. (2006).
Interestingly, the study found that participation in IS security decision-making led to
enhanced feelings of three dimensions of psychological empowerment. This is consistent with
results reported by Wallach and Muller (2006), who found that actual participation in decisionmaking pertinent to one’s own work had a strong positive influence on the meaning and
autonomy, and was marginally related to the impact and competence dimensions of
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psychological empowerment. This indicates that participation in decision-making should enable
employees to contribute their opinions in the decision related to the IS security task alongside
their superiors. Thus, participation allows employees to feel that they have opportunity for
freedom and independence for IS security task-related decisions. Further, when employees
participate in the decision-making process, they may enjoy the opportunity to set the IS security
decisions jointly with their superiors. This could make them feel that they are an important asset
to the organization and that they can impact their work environment. While participating,
employees have the opportunity to provide input that is consistent with their own values or
needs, increasing the feeling that the IS security tasks are meaningful and important. Finally,
their involvement with the decision-making process allows them to enhance the mastery
experience of IS security, which should increases their feelings of competence.
In sum, all the hypothesized relations between the structural empowerment facets and the
dimensions of psychological empowerment were supported. As expected, this study found that
when employees were engaged in their work environment through empowerment work practices,
such as opportunity for training, access to information, and participation in decision-making
related to IS security, it is likely that employees felt more empowered in terms of their feelings
competence, meaningfulness, impact, and choice. This supports the contention made in prior
studies that different dimensions of empowerment are influenced by different antecedents (i.e.,
Spretizer et al., 1997; Kraimer et al., 1999).
Research Question 3
Finally, this dissertation explored how the dimensions of psychological empowerment
mediate the relations between structural empowerment facets and IS security policy compliance
intentions. This study provides evidence that structural empowerment facets are associated with

130

two of the dimensions of psychological empowerment—and that both in turn are related to IS
security policy compliance intentions. The mediating effects that were uncovered involved the
competence dimension of psychological empowerment in the relations between SETA and IS
security policy compliance (hypothesis 10) and the meaning dimension of psychological
empowerment in the relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security
policy compliance (hypothesis 11), as well as participation in IS security decision-making
processes and IS security policy compliance (hypothesis 12a). However, the impact and choice
dimensions of psychological empowerment did not mediate the relations between participation and
IS security policy compliance (hypothesis 12b and 12c). These findings suggest that the
structural empowerment practices characterized by SETA, access to IS security strategy and
goals, and participation in IS security decision-making processes are important in influencing
two psychological empowerment dimensions (i.e., competence and meaning), which should
ultimately motivate employees to engage and expend more time and energy in IS security policy
compliance. This finding provides support for Liden et al.’s (1990), who reported that meaning
and competence mediated the relations between job characteristics and work satisfaction as well
as commitment.
Finally, an ad hoc analysis was performed to determine whether the mediating role of
perceptions of meaning and competence are partial or full mediation. The study found that
meaning fully mediated the effects of participation in IS security decision-making on intention to
comply with IS security policy. Competence was found to partially mediated the relations
between SETA and intention to comply with IS security policy and meaning partially mediated
the relations between access to IS security goals and IS security policy compliance intentions.
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6.3 Summary
This study identifies four components of psychological empowerment - feelings of
competence, meaning, impact, and choice - to provide theoretical explanations for the
antecedents of the employees’ intention to comply with IS security policy. Furthermore, the
study postulates that structural empowerment facets, including SETA, access to IS security
strategy and goals, and participation in IS security decision-making, may influence employees’
compliance intentions indirectly through the dimensions of psychological empowerment.
Overall, the study found support for the theoretical model. Based on the data collected from 289
respondents who were familiar with the IS security policy requirements, all but four of the
hypotheses were supported. Figure 6.1 represents the IS security policy compliance model
derived from this study.
A number of implications may be derived from the results. One of the more important
implications follows from the indirect (full mediation via meaning) relations between
participation in IS security decision-making and IS security policy compliance intentions. A
complete understanding of employees’ IS security behaviors in organizations requires the
recognition of both intrinsic and external factors. Focusing only on providing structural
empowerment (i.e. extrinsic factor) to the exclusion of psychological empowerment (i.e. intrinsic
factor) provides an incomplete picture of IS security behaviors.

Figure 0.1: Current study IS security policy compliance model
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Pyschological empowerment, dominated by the meaning
g and competence dimensions,
had an overall
ll positive impact on employee IS security policy compliance intentions. These
results indicate that individual intention to execute IS security tasks (i.e., compliance with IS
security policy) in the workplace are influenced by their perceptions of how the goals of IS
security are meaningful
ningful and important to them, and by the degree of confidence in the skills and
abilities they have about
out the IS security tasks
tasks. That is, individual perceptions
per
about
empowerment, specifically with regard to their perceived competence and meaning dimensions
dimensio
related to IS security tasks, plays vital role in affecting their IS security behaviors.
behavior These
findings provide evidence of the importance of intrinsic motivational factors in influencing
employee compliance behavior. This is clearly in line with IS security research findings that
acknowledge the importance of intrinsic factors in the conduct of IS security behaviors
behavior (Herath
and Rao, 2009b; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 2011).
The question that arises
es as a result of these observations is: what are the strategies to
maximize employees intrinsic motivation, especially their feelings of empowerment related to IS
security tasks? This study provides evidence that the psychological empowerment of employees
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related to IS security tasks can be influenced by the structure in organizations that share power
with their employees. The sharing of power is materialized in term of engaging employees in the
IS security decision-making process, giving them more opportunities to access the IS security
strategy and goals, and providing them with training and education programs related to IS
security (SETA). Participation in IS security decision-making was found to positively relate to
the three dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e. meaning, impact, and choice), SETA
and access to IS security strategy and goals were related to the competence and meaning
dimensions of empowerment, respectively. Participation in IS security decision-making allows
employees to contribute their inputs, ideas, and thoughts in the risk assessment, design, and
implementation of IS security controls, hence increasing their feelings of empowerment. This
result is particularly interesting in light of Dhillon et al.’s (2004) view that employees who were
left out from all major decision-making and had no say on the latest developments related to IS
security in the organization has been attributed to feelings of oppression. Providing SETA to all
levels of employees in organizations gives them the opportunity to impart general knowledge of
IS security environment, along with the skills necessary to perform the required IS security tasks.
Finally, communicating the well specified IS security policy that consists of goals of IS security
allows individuals to feel informed about where an organization is headed in the context of IS
security. Thus, organizations attempting to foster empowerment should pay particular attention
to give employees opportunities to participate in IS security decision-making, access to SETA
and IS security strategy and goals.
An interesting feature of this study concerns the mediating effects of the competence and
meaning, on the relations between the structural empowerment facets and the IS security policy
compliance intentions. According to Nielsen (1986), changing the organization’s structural
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context is not enough to influence individual behavior; ultimately, an individual feelings of
empowerment are necessary to influence such behavior (cf. Spreitzer, 1996). Consistent with this
line of argument, this study suggests that the meaning and competence dimensions may play a
mediating role with respect to IS security compliance behavior.
The mediating effects have an implication for the interpretation of many IS security
studies that have tested the direct effects between work environment, such as participation,
communication of the goals, and training, and IS security outcome while excluding the
psychological state. The results of this dissertation indicate that SETA not only has a direct effect
on IS security behavior shown in previous studies (e.g., D’Arcy et al., 2009) but also the indirect
effect through feelings of competence. Similarly, studies that have examined the relations
between participation and effective IS security (e.g., Spears and Barki, 2010) has not tested the
mediating effects. The current study has found that the meaning dimension of psychological
empowerment completely mediate the relations between participation in IS security decisionmaking and IS security compliance. Furthermore, Boss et al. (2009) identified that a wellspecified IS policy that gives clear directions to achieve IS security goals, was related to
precautionary behavior via perceptions of mandatoriness of IS security policy compliance. The
present study provides similar results, but tested the mediating role of feelings of meaning in the
relations between access to IS security strategy and goals and IS security policy compliance.
Therefore, these findings indicate that focusing on extrinsic factors is not enough to truly
understand the underlying reason of employee IS security policy compliance intentions.
However, the results did not support earlier prediction that employees feelings of impact
and choice may influence their IS security policy compliance intentions. While the results did
not support Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model, this is not surprising.
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Earlier studies found that different dimensions of psychological empowerment may have
different strengths to influence different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kramier et al., 1999;
Wat and Shaffer, 2005). For instance, Wat and Shaffer (2005) found that the meaning dimension
relates to courtesy behavior, the competence dimension relates to consceintiousness and
sportmanship behaviors, the impact dimension predicts consceintiousness, and the selfdetermination dimension relates to altruism. In fact, Kraimer et al. (1999) purported that the
impact and self-determination dimensions are personal control that are expected to be related to
affective outcomes, rather than behavioral outcomes.
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In the context of this study, impact refers to an individual sense of control over the
outcomes of the IS security tasks. One possible explanation for the negative relations between
feelings of impact and IS security policy compliance intentions would be that, while employees
perceived that they can impact their organizations if they perform the IS security tasks, the IS
security tasks might be too complicated or too technical. Due to the complexity of the IS security
tasks, they might think that the IT team or IT department will take care of it, and thus, feel that
there is no need to put too much effort on the IS security tasks. As a result, their IS security
policy compliance intentions is not as high as others are. Another, more likely, explanation is
that the negative coefficient is statistical artifact. When the correlated independent variables are
regressed simultaneously, the regression coefficients become unstable, manifested in the form of
either reduced magnitude of effect size or change in direction (Pedhazur and Schmelkin cf. Wat
and Shaffer, 2005). In this study, the bivariate correlation between feelings of impact and IS
security compliance was not even significant (see Table 0.9. Note the positive, but not significant
correlation between impact and IS security policy compliance). Thus, the relations between
feelings of impact and IS security policy compliance merits further investigation.
Choice or self-determination refers to individuals sense of control of IS security tasks.
The insignificant effect of self-determination on IS security policy compliance may indicate that
having autonomy in IS security tasks is less important than having feelings of meaning and
competence. One possible explanation might be the fact the IS security policy compliance is
perceived as mandatory (Boss et al., 2009). Therefore, whether or not the employees may have a
high degree of control over what IS security tasks to take and how to perform these IS security
tasks, they may expend effort to comply with IS security policy. Also, while individuals may
appreciate IS security task autonomy, the act of securing the information is considered as ‘part of
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the job’ hence individuals apply much effort in doing the IS security tasks regardless of their
autonomy. Another possible explanation is that, as suggested by Kraimer et al. (1999) having a
sense of control of IS security tasks may be more related to affective outcomes, such as
emotional distress, job satisfaction, and role stress, rather than task effort and performance. From
a methodological perspective, as explained in the previous paragraph, the insignificant findings
may be due to a statistical artifact (see Table 5.9. Note the positive and the significant correlation
between choice and IS security policy compliance [r = .211, p <.01]). Thus, the relations
between perceived choice and IS security behavior requires further investigation.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This thesis has involved an empirical investigation of intrinsic motivation and IS security
policy compliance intentions. This encapsulates theoretical reasoning from two theories. The
central research question underpinning this thesis was: how does intrinsic motivational factor
influence one’s intention to comply with IS security policy? All relevant literature towards
identifying and answering the research questions were consolidated in Chapter 2. Based on the
review in Chapter 2, a conceptual model and the hypotheses were developed in Chapter 3. The
quantitative research approach was suggested to investigate the expectations, was discussed in
Chapter 4. The quantitative model was tested in Chapter 5, followed by the discussion of the
results in Chapter 6. This chapter addresses the practical and theoretical implications of the
dissertation. Finally, a discussion of the limitations of this dissertation and possible future
research directions are discussed.

7.2 Contributions of the Study
The most important part of any study is the contribution it makes to a body of knowledge.
This research makes several contributions cross the practical and theoretical realms. The
following sections highlight the contributions of research as these relate to the IS security
literature and beyond.
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Theoretical Contributions
This research makes five major theoretical contributions. First, as far our review of the
literature, this is perhaps the first study investigating effects of psychological empowerment
derived from the assessment of IS security tasks. Such an investigation extends the use of
Thomas and Velthouse’s (1990) intrinsic motivation model. Differing from previous studies that
examine the effects of extrinsic and/or intrinsic motivations (e.g., Straub, 1990; Bulgurcu et al.,
2010; Boss et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009a; Herath and Rao, 2009b; Son, 2011), the present
study focuses on how the assessments of IS security tasks stimulate the feelings of competence,
meaning, impact, and choice and thereby motivates individuals to expend effort to perform the IS
security tasks. Such a focus allows us to increase our knowledge of IS security behavior
motivations. The results support prior studies that employees may be intrinsically motivated to
comply with IS security policy. Further, the dissertation used the variables from Kanter’s (1977)
structural empowerment theory, including training, access to information, and participation, as
antecedents of the intrinsic motivation. Although the variables are not new in IS security
literature, they are used in this study to predict psychological empowerment, and ultimately to
influence IS security behavior, unlike other studies that used these variables to predict the direct
association with IS security behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Spears and Barki, 2010). Hence, the
results of this study are able to explain how structural empowerment can contribute to
improve IS security behaviors, via psychological empowerment.
Second, this study provides fresh empirical affirmation in the literature from a new
context of investigation. The study investigated the relations between psychological
empowerment and individual performance-related outcome on a very specific task (i.e., IS
security tasks). The results imply that psychological empowerment, dominated by feelings of
meaning and competence, shows relation with IS security policy compliance intentions. This
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validates the extensive findings from different research settings for a very specific task and a
new context, and helps with generalization.
Third, this study contributes to the empowerment literature by investigating the
individual dimensions of psychological empowerment and structural empowerment facets,
separately. This study provides in-depth considerations of the various facets of structural
empowerment and the dimensions of psychological empowerment, which have not received due
attention in the literature (Maynard et al., 2012). Prior studies often ‘bundle’ these dimensions.
Hence, this study is able to explain which dimensions are actually driving the associations.
Among those structural empowerment facets, participation in IS security decision-making is
related to three dimensions of psychological empowerment (i.e, meaning, impact, and choice).
SETA can only predict perceptions of competence, and access to IS security strategy and goals is
related to the meaning dimension only. In terms of predicting IS security policy compliance
intentions, only competence and meaning dimensions are the significant variables. These results
further confirm prior studies that postulate different dimensions of psychological empowerment
predict different outcomes and driven by different factors (Spreitzer et al., 1997).
Fourth, the study investigated the mediating role of psychological empowerment. The
mediating effects that were uncovered involve the meaning and competence dimensions in the
relations between structural empowerment facets and IS security compliance behavior. The
results further enhance the current body of literature across a wide variety of studies that have
confirmed the mediating role of psychological empowerment. More interestingly, this study
contributes to the literature by explicitly testing the individual dimensions as a mediator. Only
two dimensions of psychological empowerment were found to be the mediators.
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Finally, the current study further validated the single 12-item measure of psychological
empowerment developed by Spreitzer (1995a). What is more interesting is that the measures
were slightly modified to fit into a very specific work task, but still both the convergent and
discriminant validity were achieved. Not only that, this study has integrated two models of
empowerment, structural (i.e., organizationally-centric) and psychological (i.e., individuallycentric) to form a complete perspective of empowerment. Spreitzer (2007) posited that a
thorough understanding of empowerment in the workplace requires the integration of both
perspectives.
Practical Implications
The primary practical implication of this research is the connection between intrinsic
motivation, measured by four dimensions of psychological empowerment, and IS security
behavior. IS security behavior of employees is critical to the success of organizations,
particularly when the incidents of IS security breaches originated from the insiders are more
costly to handle than the outsider IS security breaches (Richardson, 2011). Employees are able to
affect the IS security of the organization by engaging in, or complying with IS security policy
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Thus, it is useful to consider the factors that motivate employees to
comply with the IS security policy (Straub, 1990; Herath and Rao, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010).
Specifically, this dissertation focused on intrinsic motivation because it has received far less
attention in IS security literature as compared to extrinsic motivation (Son, 2011; Padayachee,
2011).
In essence, this dissertation demonstrates how psychological empowerment, dominated
by meaning and competence dimensions, can influence employees IS security policy compliance
intentions. This is encouraging, as it suggests that employees who feel empowered about their IS
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security tasks are more willing to expend more efforts towards accomplishing the IS security
tasks. As such, organizations that are concerned about managing human functions related to IS
security should note that in order to increase employees’ IS security policy compliance, imposing
more external and controlled forces (e.g., sanctions, social pressures, and rewards) is not enough.
Rather, management should find ways to maximize employees' intrinsic motivation, in terms of
feelings of competence and meaning, in order to increase the likelihood of compliance.
In relation to the above, the present study investigated factors to enhance the intrinsic
motivation. The current study offers important strategies for organizations to increase
employees’ intrinsic motivation. Rather than spending more money on providing rewards or
implementing penalties to encourage (or discourage) IS security policy compliance (or noncompliance), organizations may actually focus on empowerment practices. As the results have
indicated, it is strongly recommended for management to share more ‘power tools’ to the
subordinates at all levels. Specifically, it is suggested that organizations attempt to foster feelings
of empowerment related to IS security, should pay specific consideration to allow employees to
participate in IS security decision-making processes. A participation strategy should give an
opportunity for employees to contribute their input, ideas and thoughts about the IS security that
are consistent with their own values or goals, and opportunities to set decisions regarding IS
security jointly with the superiors. When employees are able to participate, they will feel
empowered, and ultimately motivate them to comply with the IS security policy.
In addition, providing training related to IS security is important to increase employees’
feeling of competence. It is strongly recommended for management to create IS security training
and education programs that strives to increase employees personal mastery of IS security via
hands-on exercises and activities or regular demonstration of IS security issues and

143

countermeasures. This will provide opportunities to observe successes and failures of other IS
security behaviors and hence encourage and support their own IS security skills and responsible
development. Thus, when designing an IS security training program, particular attention should
be given to increasing employee IS security skills. Furthermore, allowing access to IS security
strategy and goals is an important strategy to enhance employees’ feelings of meaning of IS
security tasks. It is recommended that management improves or diversifies the communication
channels so that the well-specified IS security policy that consists of goals of IS security is
conveyed to all employees. When employees understand the direction where the organization is
heading related to IS security, they might know how their own IS security tasks would contribute
to achieving the IS security goals. That is because employees find connections between the goals
of IS security policy and their values.
Finally, it is suggested that when there are limited resources in organizations to empower
the employees, management can combine those strategies. For example, management can
communicate IS security strategy and goals in IS security training programs in order to affect
both feelings of competence and meaning. Further, participation strategy could include
participation in goal-setting decisions instead of only in IS security task-related decisions.

7.3 Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, this study employed cross-sectional approach to
understand individuals IS security policy compliance. There are few weaknesses of this
approach. For instance, it does not permit conclusions concerning causal direction. Further work
should employ a longitudinal or an experimental design to lend further support to the causal
relations hypothesized. Second, it is possible that the respondents’ feelings and thoughts in
answering the survey questions were influenced by environments, known as a ‘halo effect’
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(Herath and Rao, 2009a). Future studies can consider capturing the information regarding
employees IS security compliance behavior by observing the behavior of employees at their
workplace, or by obtaining the information from other sources (i.e., supervisors, peers). Case
studies from one or a few organizations would also be useful future research since such case
studies could provide an opportunity to measure employees’ actual behavior related to IS
security policy compliance and actual information regarding the structural empowerment
practices at the workplace. In addition, respondents to this study self-reported their intention to
comply with IS security policy. There is a possibility that they masked their true intention
because noncompliance is socially undesirable (Trevino, 1992). To overcome the issue, Siponen
and Vance (2010) suggested a use of hypothetical scenarios that provide a richer description.
Second, limitations are identified related to selection of participation. The non-random
selection of MBA, MBA Executive, and MS Executive students in the USA to represent
employees in organizations has limitation on several fronts. The first is that not all of them were
necessarily currently working. While careful consideration was made to ensure that only people
currently employed were selected as respondents, there was still a possibility that they were not.
The next limitation with using students is generalizing results to all employees. As the nonrandom selection has represented different companies in various industries, the results are only
generalizable to a similar population. Further, the limitations include data homogeneity, because
the research only involved US data. Hence, one of the most important steps should be to conduct
this study with a random selection of employees in various organizations across countries, and
not just students.
Finally, since all measures were self-reported, thus the identified relations may have been
inflated by common method variance (CMV). However, the fact that the Harman’s factor score
test found discriminant validity of the measures, it could weaken the issue of CMV.
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7.4 Future Research
To extend the findings of this study, three recommendations are suggested for future
investigations. First, the results of the present study indicate that, different from what was
hypothesized, feelings of impact have a negative effect, and feelings of autonomy have no effect,
on IS security policy compliance intentions. Future researchers are urged to further investigate
these two psychological empowerments components’ effects, and find possible contingent
factors that may affect their influences on IS security policy compliance. It is speculated that the
dimensions of psychological empowerment may interact.
Second, this study has investigated and determined the importance of employees’ beliefs
regarding competence of IS security tasks on their decision to perform or not to perform the IS
security tasks. However, this study has used the term ‘IS security tasks’ to represent the overall
or general IS security tasks. If more specific focus, such as complexity of IS security tasks were
considered (e.g., security patching task and updating password task requiring different level of
skills), we would be able to obtain more specific and meaningful results on how to design the
SETA. Assuming the results show that respondents do not comply with IS security because they
are not confident with their ability to do the patching task which is more difficult than the
password changing task, SETA programs can be modified to focus on patching task. Thus, one
possible direction for future research would be to focus on a very specific IS security tasks to
truly understand the relation between employees’ perceptions of competence and behavioral
outcome. Future study may also test for the moderating effect of IS security task complexity.
Third, the focus of the current study is on structural empowerment practices, as
antecedent of psychological empowerment. Therefore, examining the effects of other factors is
beyond the scope of this study. Future research should use a more integrated model to compare
and contrast different drivers to enhance feelings of empowerment. It would be desirable for
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future studies to include other external variables such as task characteristics, leader-member
exchange (LMX), formal and informal power, and personality traits.

7.5 Summary
In sum, this dissertation has provided three primary contributions to the IS security
literature. First, this study has considered the influence of psychological empowerment on
employees IS security policy compliance intentions answering previous calls for research that
examines the intrinsic motivation for IS security behavior (Herath and Rao, 2009b; Padayachee,
2011, Son, 2011). Most notably, the findings of this research have shown the importance of two
dimensions of psychological empowerment, competence and meaning when investigating the
intrinsic motivation for IS security compliance. In addition, different dimensions of
psychological empowerment may predict different outcomes (Spreitzer et al., 1997; Kraimer et
al., 1999). Consistent with this line of argument, this study has confirmed that the competence
and meaning dimensions are more important than the impact and choice dimensions in predicting
individuals performance-related outcome, in the context of IS security. Second, this dissertation
has considered how structural empowerment influences the psychological empowerment
(Spreitzer, 1995a; Spreitzer, 1996). The findings have indicated that different structural
empowerment facets predict different dimensions of psychological empowerment. Finally, this
dissertation has shown the potential for structural empowerment to affect IS security compliance
intentions via two dimensions of psychological empowerment—competence and meaning. In
other words, psychological empowerment is a key mechanism that explains how structural
empowerment contributes to IS security compliance intentions.
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APPENDIX
Figure 9.1: Visual Representation of the Measurement Model
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Figure 9.2: Visual Representation of the Structural Model
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Figure 9.3: Full SEM
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Figure 9.4: Questionnaire
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Coverage
The study relates employees in the USA and compliance with organizational IS security
policies.

Respondents
Current and previous employees in various work setting should answer this questionnaire.
Respondents must be at least 18 years of age.

The Questions
The questions only require your perception with respect to information systems and information
security in your organization. Please keep information systems and information security of
your organization in your mind while you fill up this questionnaire. Read the questionnaire
statements and select the most appropriate answer for each. There is no right or wrong answer. It
is your opinion that is most justifiable. Some of the questions look similar, but this is important
to ensure that we can assess your response scientifically and draw valid conclusions.

Confidentiality, risks and the use of data
Your participation with this study is voluntary. By participating, you will help Information
System (IS) research at VCU. As with any research study there are risks. The risks in this study
are minimal. Participants could become uncomfortable while answering some of the questions,
although there are no risks expected by participating in this study. Your response will be
confidential, only group data will be analyzed.

Thank you for your participation!
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Part I: Survey questions

1. Has your organization established IS security policies?
□ Yes

□ No

2. To what extent are you aware of the regulations prescribed by the IS security policies of
your organization?
Completely

Completely

unaware

aware

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please answer the following questions using a 1 to 7 scale with 1-Strongly Disagree, and
7-Strong Agree. Please circle your answer to each question.
3. I intend to comply with the requirements of the IS security
policies of my organization in the future.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. I actively participate in defining, reviewing or approving any
IS security controls related to protecting
the organization's information (e.g. access control, separation
of duties, employee training on IS security awareness and etc.)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. My organization provides employees with education on
computer software copyright laws.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job of
securing information and information systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom
in how I do my job of securing information and information
systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. In managing risk to information and information systems in my 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
company, I actively perform, or contribute to
decision-making in any risk management activities (e.g.
documenting business processes or transactions for risk
evaluation, ensuring key controls exist to mitigate specific
types of risks, implementing control and etc.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. I have significant influence over what happens in my
department
10. I understand top management's IS security vision of the
organization.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. My organization provides training to help employees improve
their awareness of computer and IS security issues.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. I have access to the strategic information I need to do my job
of securing information and information systems well.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. In my organization, employees are briefed on the consequences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of modifying computerized data in an unauthorized way.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. My work of securing information and information systems is
personally meaningful to me.
15. My work of securing information and information systems is
very important to me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. My organization educates employees on their computer
security responsibilities.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

17. I have a great deal of control over what happen in my
department.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

18. My work of securing information and information systems is
meaningful to me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19. I have mastered the skills necessary for my job of securing
information and information systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20. I am confident about my ability to do my job of securing
information and information systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

21. My impact on what happens in my department related to IS
security is large.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

22. I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my job of
securing information and information systems activities.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

23. I can decide on my own how to go about doing my job of
securing information and information systems.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

24. I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the IS
security policies of my organization when I use information
and technology in the future.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

25. In my organization, employees are briefed on the consequences 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of accessing computer systems that they are not authorized to
use.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. I intend to protect information and technology resources
according to the requirements of the IS security policies of my
organization in the future.
27. I understand the IS security strategies and goals of the
organization.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Part II: About yourself and your organization
28. Your gender
□ Male

□ Female

29. Your highest level of education
□ Less than high school

□ Undergraduate degree

□ High school degree

□ Graduate degree

□ College degree

□ Other

□ 20–25

□ 56–65

□ 26–35

□ 66–75

□ 36–45

□ 76–85

30. Your age

31. How many years have you used a computer and the Internet? ___________
32. On average, how many hours do you use a computer for work every day? ___________
33. How many years have you worked for your current organization?
□ less than 1 year

□ 10 - 15 years

□ 1 – 5 years

□ more than 15 years

□ 5 – 10 years
34. How many years have you worked in your current position in the organization?
□ less than 1 year

□ 10 - 15 years

□ 1 – 5 years

□ more than 15 years

□ 5 – 10 years
35. Your job title is ______________________________________
36. Number of employees in your organization
□ Fewer than 500

□ 5,000–10,000
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□ 500–999

□ More than 10,000

□ 1,000–4,999
37. Annual sales revenue of your organization (in your local currency)
□ Less than 1 million

□ 200 million – 500 million

□ 1 million – 5 million

□ 500 million – 1 billion

□ 6 million – 10 million

□ 1 billion – 5 billion

□ 10 million – 50 million

□ More than 5 billion

□ 50 million – 200 million
38. In which industry is your organization operating?
□ Education

□ Real Estate

□ Financial Services

□ Services

□ Government

□ Information Technology

□ Food/Beverage/CPG

□ Telecommunications

□ Health Care

□ Travel

□ Manufacturing□

□ Wholesale/Retail

□ Nonprofit

□ Other, please specify ______________

□ Medical, Bio-Technology, Pharmacology

Thank you for participating
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